The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality? by Choi, Stephen et al.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
1-1-2010 
The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality? 
Stephen Choi 
NYU Law School 
Jill E. Fisch 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Marcel Kahan 
NYU Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Business Law, Public 
Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, Law and Economics 
Commons, Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Choi, Stephen; Fisch, Jill E.; and Kahan, Marcel, "The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?" (2010). 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 331. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/331 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
CHOIFISCHKAHAN GALLEYSFINAL 7/8/2010 2:55 PM 
 
THE POWER OF PROXY ADVISORS: MYTH OR REALITY? 
Stephen Choi* 
Jill Fisch** 
Marcel Kahan∗∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Recent regulatory changes increasing shareholder voting authority have 
focused attention on the role of proxy advisors.  In particular, greater 
shareholder empowerment raises the question of how much proxy advisors 
influence voting outcomes.  This Article analyzes the significance of voting 
recommendations issued by four proxy advisory firms in connection with 
uncontested director elections.  We find, consistent with press reports, that 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) is the most powerful proxy advisor and 
that, of the others, only Glass, Lewis & Co. seems to have a meaningful impact 
on shareholder voting. 
This Article also attempts to measure the impact of voting 
recommendations on voting outcomes.  Unlike prior literature, it distinguishes 
correlation from causality by examining both the recommendation itself and 
the underlying factors that may influence a shareholder’s vote.  Using several 
different tests, we conclude that popular accounts substantially overstate the 
influence of ISS.  Our findings reveal that the impact of an ISS 
recommendation is reduced greatly once company- and firm-specific factors 
important to investors are taken into consideration.  Overall, we estimate that 
an ISS recommendation shifts 6%–10% of shareholder votes.  We also 
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determine that a major component of ISS’s influence stems from its role as an 
information agent, aggregating factors that its subscribers consider important. 
INTRODUCTION 
Proxy advisors—private firms that analyze corporate elections and advise 
investor clients on how to vote their shares—are recent and potentially 
powerful new players in the corporate governance world.1  Institutional 
investors, which hold an increasing percentage of the shares of U.S. 
companies,2 wield substantial voting power but often lack the appropriate 
incentives to cast informed ballots with respect to their portfolio companies.3  
Instead, many institutional investors employ the services of proxy advisors to 
assist them in exercising their voting rights.4  The services of proxy advisors 
include providing research, helping investors develop voting guidelines, 
handling the mechanics of the voting process, and offering recommendations  
 
 
 1 See Albert Verdam, An Exploration of the Role of Proxy Advisors in Proxy Voting (Feb. 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=978835) (describing 
the emergence of proxy advisors); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER 
MEETINGS: ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY VOTING 6–12 
(2007) [hereinafter GAO, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07765. 
pdf (exploring competition and potential conflicts of interest in the proxy advisor market); Colin Diamond & 
Irina Yevmenenko, Who Is Overseeing the Proxy Advisors?, 3 BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J. 606, 608 (2008) 
(highlighting the proxy advisor market). 
 2 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987 (2010); see also Paul Rose, The 
Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 897 (2007) (“In 1965, institutional investors held 16% of 
U.S. equities; by 2001, institutional investors held 61%.”). 
 3 According to conventional wisdom, these institutional investors generally do not care enough about 
their votes to cast an informed ballot.  They hold shares in too many companies, so any particular stake 
represents a small fraction of their portfolio, and how they vote is unlikely to affect the outcome and even if it 
did, the effect on the value of their portfolio would be minimal.  Researching the issues on a company’s annual 
meeting agenda is costly, and institutions may also lack the necessary expertise to evaluate these issues 
adequately.  See, e.g., Rose, supra note 2, at 897 (“Unless an institutional investor believes that it can conduct 
research for less, or that more expensive but discerning research will enable it to obtain better returns (after 
subtracting its own research costs), the investor may be better off outsourcing its corporate governance 
research.”); Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive Compensation 
Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 354 (2009) (“Institutional investors, despite having greater capacity to monitor 
and gather information, may have too small a stake in a company or too limited industry expertise to monitor it 
actively.”).  
 4 See, e.g., GAO, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER, supra note 1, at 13 (describing ISS’s client base as 
consisting of an estimated 1,700 institutional investors). 
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on each issue on a company’s agenda.5  In some cases, institutional investors 
may even subcontract their voting decisions to proxy advisors.6 
As a result of their capacity to influence voting, proxy advisors are 
regarded as very powerful.7  The popular, business, and academic media 
describe ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services, a division of RiskMetrics), 
the proxy advisor with the largest client base,8 and Glass, Lewis & Co., which 
has the second largest client base,9 as “influential,”10 “powerful,”11 and having 
great “clout.”12  Commentators have claimed that ISS alone is able to influence 
shareholder votes by 19%,13 13.6 to 20.6%,14 30%,15 and even “a third or 
more.”16  The collective power of proxy advisors arguably is even greater.  As 
a result of this influence, management and shareholder activists alike 
frequently lobby ISS to endorse their respective positions.  As related by 
Delaware’s Vice-Chancellor Leo Strine: 
[P]owerful CEOs come on bended knee to Rockville, Maryland, 
where ISS resides, to persuade the managers of ISS of the merits of 
 
 5 See, e.g., Glass, Lewis & Co., Proxy Paper: Proxy Research and Voting Recommendations on Global 
Proxies, http://www.glasslewis.com/solutions/proxypaper.php (last visited Aug. 11, 2009) (describing Glass 
Lewis’s proxy research, voting recommendations, and voting platform for voting subscribers’ shares); 
RiskMetrics Group, Custom Proxy Advisory, http://www.riskmetrics.com/custom_proxy_advisory (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2009) (describing how ISS works with clients to develop customized voting guidelines). 
 6 RiskMetrics Group, Proxy Advisory Services, http://www.riskmetrics.com/proxy_advisory/options 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2009) (detailing the choice of ISS guidelines that subscribers can use and incorporate into 
“RiskMetrics’ turnkey voting agency services”). 
 7 See generally GAO, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER, supra note 1. 
 8 See id. at 4. 
 9 Stephen Davis, White Knight Swoops in for Glass Lewis, DIRECTORSHIP, Dec. 2007/Jan. 2008, at 7 
(“Glass Lewis is the world’s second biggest proxy adviser next to RiskMetrics . . . .”). 
 10 See, e.g., Pallavi Gogoi, Support for Bank of America CEO Wanes; Shareholders Meet Today, and 
Many Want Him Out, USA TODAY, Apr. 29, 2009, at B1 (describing RiskMetrics as “[i]nfluential”); Robert D. 
Hershey Jr., A Little Industry with a Lot of Sway on Proxy Votes, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2006, § 3, at 6 (quoting 
David W. Smith, president of the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals, stating that 
“‘[t]he influence [proxy] advisers wield is extraordinary’”). 
 11 See, e.g., Matt O’Sullivan, When Only a Corporate Jet Will Do, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 28, 
2009, at 25 (describing RiskMetrics as “America’s most powerful shareholder voting adviser”). 
 12 See, e.g., Kim Clark, Reading Proxies for Fun and Profit, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 22, 2006, 
at EE10 (describing Glass Lewis’s “growing clout”); Joann S. Lublin, RiskMetrics’s Head Faces His Day of 
Shareholder Judgment, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2008, at C1 (“ISS Governance Services . . . exerts tremendous 
clout in advising institutional investors on proxy fights . . . .”). 
 13 Jie Cai, Jacqueline L. Garner & Ralph A. Walkling, Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389, 2404 (2009). 
 14 Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory Environment on 
Shareholder Voting, FIN. MGMT, Winter 2002, at 29, 30. 
 15 Posting of William J. Holstein to BNET: The Corner Office, http://blogs.bnet.com/ceo/?p=1100&tag= 
content;col1 (Feb. 7, 2008, 08:03).  
 16 See Rose, supra note 2, at 889 (attributing this view to executives). 
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their views about issues like proposed mergers, executive 
compensation, and poison pills.  They do so because the CEOs 
recognize that some institutional investors will simply follow ISS’s 
advice rather than do any thinking of their own.  ISS has been so 
successful that it now has a California rival, Glass Lewis.17 
Similarly, commentators have observed that “boards may do what they believe 
ISS wants them to in order to keep their seats, whether or not their belief is 
justified.”18 
This influence is troubling in light of the limited accountability of proxy 
advisors.  Proxy advisors do not have a financial stake in the companies about 
which they provide voting advice; they owe no fiduciary duties to the 
shareholders of these companies;19 and they are not subject to any meaningful 
regulation.20  Moreover, it is not clear that the proxy advisory industry is 
sufficiently competitive and transparent to subject advisory firms—ISS in 
particular—to substantial market discipline.21  Institutional investors, for the 
reasons outlined above, may lack sufficient interest in voting to scrutinize 
advisors’ recommendations carefully.  In addition, ISS has, until recently, 
enjoyed a near-monopoly position and still remains the dominant firm 
providing voting advice.22 
The ability of proxy advisors to influence investor voting becomes 
particularly significant as the importance of shareholder voting increases.  
With respect to director elections, most U.S. companies have shifted in recent 
years from plurality to majority voting.23  Under plurality voting, the nominees 
 
 17 Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges 
We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 688 (2005). 
 18 Diamond & Yevmenenko, supra note 1, at 617. 
 19 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s 
Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1765 (2006) (“Unlike corporate 
managers, neither institutional investors as stockholders nor ISS as a voting advisor owe fiduciary duties to the 
corporations whose policies they seek to influence.”). 
 20 See GAO, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER, supra note 1, at 8–9 (observing that, as pension consultants, 
ISS and Proxy Governance, Inc. (PGI) are registered with the SEC as investment advisors while Glass Lewis 
and Egan-Jones are not registered as investment advisors). 
 21 See id. at 14 (acknowledging that “newer proxy advisory firms may face challenges attracting clients 
and establishing themselves in the industry”). 
 22 Id. at 7; Rose, supra note 2, at 899 (“ISS is the dominant firm in the corporate governance  
industry . . . .”). 
 23 In 2005, more than 90% of S&P 500 companies employed plurality voting.  See, e.g., Brooke A. 
Masters, Shareholders Flex Muscles; Proxy Measures Pushing Corporate Accountability Gain Support, 
WASH. POST, June 17, 2006, at D1 (stating that, as of the start of 2005, fewer than thirty S&P 500 companies 
CHOIFISCHKAHAN GALLEYSF 7/8/2010  2:55 PM 
2010] THE POWER OF PROXY ADVISORS 873 
who win the most votes are elected, regardless of the number of votes that are 
“withheld.”24  Thus, in an uncontested election, a single vote in favor is enough 
to assure a nominee’s election.  By contrast, a majority standard requires a 
nominee to receive a majority of the votes cast.25  Under this standard, 
shareholders can prevent the election of a nominee even without nominating a 
competing candidate; the voters simply must cast a sufficient number of 
“withhold” votes.  As a consequence, the shift to a majority standard 
substantially increases the importance of shareholder voting in uncontested 
elections. 
Over the same time period, a large number of companies dismantled their 
staggered boards.26  The percentage of S&P 500 companies with staggered 
boards declined from 55% in 2005 to 40% in 2007.27  In companies with 
staggered boards, typically only one-third of the board is up for election in any 
given year.28  With a non-staggered board, the whole board is up for election.  
Dismantling the staggered board increases the number of directors up for 
election each year, thereby increasing the opportunity for shareholders to 
exercise their franchise.  Indeed, the move from the typical three-year 
staggered board to non-staggered, annual elections triples the potential impact 
of the shareholder vote. 
Finally, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has adopted a rule that 
eliminates discretionary broker voting in uncontested director elections.29  
 
had majority voting or director resignation policies in place).  By 2008, over 80% had moved away from 
plurality voting.  Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 23. 
 24 Under plurality voting, a shareholder in an uncontested election may cast a vote in favor of a director 
candidate or withhold voting authority but may not cast a vote “against” the nominees.  See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, 
The Transamerica Case, in THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 46, 68 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 2008) 
(explaining the concept of “withheld” votes). 
 25 See id. at 69 (explaining majority voting). 
 26 Commentators have described effective staggered boards as the most powerful anti-takeover device 
and thus the most effective mechanism by which boards can insulate themselves from shareholder voice.  See, 
e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of 
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 889–91 (2002). 
 27 Stephen Taub, Revival of Classified Boards? Well, Maybe Not, COMPLIANCE WK., Sept. 11, 2007, 
http://www.complianceweek.com/article/3647/revival-of-classified-boards-well-maybe-not. 
 28 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2009); see also Gregory T. Carrott, The Case for and 
Against Staggered Boards, DIRECTORSHIP, Sept. 22, 2009, http://www.directorship.com/against-staggered-
boards/ (explaining that, most often, staggered boards provide directors with three year terms). 
 29 In October 2006, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) proposed to amend Rule 452 governing 
broker votes to redefine all director elections as “non-routine,” which would eliminate the ability of brokers to 
cast discretionary votes.  PROXY WORKING GROUP, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY 
WORKING GROUP TO THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 3 (2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/ 
PWG_REPORT.pdf.  On July 1, 2009, the SEC finally approved the amendments, effectively ending broker 
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Historically, brokers who did not receive voting instructions from the 
beneficial owners of shares in their brokerage accounts were permitted to vote 
these shares in their discretion.30  Brokers generally exercised their discretion 
to vote the shares in favor of the slate nominated by the company—the so-
called management slate.31  These discretionary broker votes are estimated to 
amount to about 19% of the votes cast at annual meetings.32  Under the revised 
NYSE rules, companies will lose a sizeable block of automatic votes in favor 
of their nominees, shifting power to those shareholders who do vote.33  The 
effect of broker voting is illustrated dramatically by the Citigroup 2009 annual 
meeting in which broker votes comprised 46% of votes cast.34  Had the NYSE 
rule been in effect, two of the Citigroup nominees would not have won re-
election. 
As the Citigroup annual meeting demonstrates, the number of directors 
who receive a large percentage of withhold votes has increased.  According to 
Georgeson, Inc., one of the leading proxy solicitation firms,35 a record 612 
directors at S&P 1500 companies received withhold votes in excess of 15% in 
the 2008 proxy season.36  Thirty directors failed to receive a majority of the 
votes cast (up from fifteen in 2007).37  Additionally, the number of contested 
elections, though still relatively small, continues to increase.  For 2008, 
 
discretionary voting in director elections.  Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by 
Amendment No. 4, to Amend NYSE Rule 452 and Corresponding Listed Company Manual Section 402.08 to 
Eliminate Broker Discretionary Voting for the Election of Directors, Except for Companies Registered Under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940, and to Codify Two Previously Published Interpretations that Do Not 
Permit Broker Discretionary Voting for Material Amendments to Investment Advisory Contracts with an 
Investment Company, Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,293 (July 1, 2009). 
 30 NYSE, Inc., Rule 452 (Mar. 6, 2003). 
 31 Kahan & Rock, supra note 2. 
 32 See Posting of Ted Allen to RiskMetrics Group, http://blog.riskmetrics.com/gov/2007/05/sec-hears-
testimony-on-broker-votessubmitted-by-ted-allen-director-of-publications.html (May 25, 2007, 10:58) 
(attributing this figure to Broadridge Financial). 
 33 See David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, A Seismic Shift in Mechanics of Electing Directors, N.Y. 
L.J., July 27, 2006, at 5 (“If, in the aftermath of NYSE rule changes as proposed, issuers indeed are unable to 
contact or obtain voting instructions from large numbers of individual shareholders, the effect will be a 
massive shift of voting power from brokers to institutions, and, therefore, to proxy advisory services such as 
ISS, Glass, Lewis & Co., and Proxy Governance.”). 
 34 Citigroup, Inc., First Quarter of 2009 (Form 10-Q), at 156–57 (May 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/q0901c.pdf?ieNocache=643. (indicating broker votes of 1.732 billion 
shares). 
 35 For information on Georgeson, see http://www.georgeson.com/. 
 36 GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 7 (2008), available at http://www. 
georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2008.pdf. 
 37 Id. at 7–8.  In 2004, twelve directors failed to receive a majority of votes cast.  Fisch, supra note 24, at 
68. 
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Georgeson reported an all-time high of fifty-six contested solicitations, 
following a previous all-time high of forty-six contested solicitations in 2007.38  
In comparison, between 1995 and 1999, the number of contested solicitations 
averaged twenty-five per year.39 
In addition to voting in director elections, shareholders vote on shareholder 
proposals introduced pursuant to Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act.40  
As institutional activism increases, the character of these shareholder proposals 
has shifted from social policy issues41 to proposals dealing with core economic 
and governance questions,42 such as executive compensation,43 shareholder 
nomination rights,44 and other corporate governance matters.45  These 
proposals are receiving increasing attention and support from shareholders.  
The number of proposals receiving majority shareholder support at S&P 1500 
companies has increased from twenty-five in 2001 to eighty-six in 2008.46  
More importantly, boards have become more responsive to proposals receiving 
majority support.  The number of implemented proposals rose from three in 
2001 to forty-three in 2008.47  As a result of these increases, shareholder power 
to introduce proposals is beginning to have a noticeable effect on the 
governance of U.S. corporations. 
 
 38 GEORGESON, supra note 36, at 8. 
 39 Id. at 46. 
 40 Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Solicitations of Proxies, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-8 (2008). 
 41 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 
1129, 1152–55 (1993) (describing the rise in shareholder use of social policy proposals in the 1950s and 
1960s). 
 42 See, e.g., A. A. Sommer, Jr., Corporate Governance in the Nineties: Managers vs. Institutions, 59 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 357, 371 (1990) (describing the shift from proposals “having a social dimension” to those dealing 
with corporate governance). 
 43 See, e.g., BNA, Annual Meeting Voting Compels More Accountability, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE REP. 
30 (2008) (listing “say on pay” executive compensation proposals as one of the top three issues on corporate 
ballots for 2008). 
 44 See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l Group, 462 F.3d 121, 123 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (addressing a shareholder proposal on proxy access). 
 45 See GEORGESON, supra note 36, at 14 fig.3 (detailing corporate governance proposals from 2004 to 
2008). 
 46 Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 27 tbl.4 (citing GEORGESON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANNUAL 
MEETING SEASON WRAP UP (2001), available at http://www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2001.pdf; 
GEORGESON, supra note 36).  Prior to 2001, Georgeson prepared a similar report, but it analyzed only 
corporate governance proposals made by institutional investors.  GEORGESON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANNUAL MEETING SEASON WRAP UP (2000), available at http://www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/ 
acgr2000.pdf. 
 47 Kahan & Rock, supra note 2. 
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Two regulatory initiatives have the potential to increase the significance of 
shareholder votes even more.  Under the first initiative—so-called “proxy 
access”—shareholders are likely to gain some ability to introduce candidates 
for the board of directors in a company’s proxy statement.  Although 
shareholders have traditionally been able to mount an election contest by 
nominating competing candidates, a company is not required to include the 
challenger’s nominees on the company proxy statement, and the challenge 
requires an independent (and costly) proxy solicitation.  For many years 
shareholders have sought the power to compel the inclusion of their nominees 
on the company’s proxy statement.48  After several unsuccessful attempts to 
persuade the SEC to adopt a rule providing for proxy access, institutional 
investors began to seek proxy access by introducing amendments to individual 
companies’ bylaws.49  Although these efforts were upheld in court,50 in 2007, 
the Republican-controlled SEC amended the proxy rules to prohibit 
shareholders from using SEC Rule 14a-8 to introduce such bylaw 
amendments.51 
In 2009, proxy access received a dramatic boost when the Delaware 
legislature amended its corporation law to authorize proxy access bylaws 
explicitly.52  Subsequently, the new Democratically-controlled SEC introduced 
a revised proxy access proposal which, if adopted, would require proxy access 
under specified conditions.53  If the SEC adopts a proxy access rule, it would 
mean that for companies with majority voting, shareholders would not only 
have the power to reject a company’s nominees to the board, but also the 
power to select nominees of their own choosing. 
The second regulatory initiative—“say-on-pay”—enables shareholders to 
vote on executive compensation.  Say-on-pay, which is modeled on a 
 
 48 Fisch, supra note 37, at 63–67 (reviewing the history of proxy access proposals); Kahan & Rock, 
supra note 2 (reviewing the history of proxy access proposals).  The SEC first considered a proposed rule 
permitting proxy access in 1942.  Fisch, supra note 37, at 63.  In 2003, the SEC solicited comments on a 
complex proposal for proxy access; the proposal stalled due to opposition from corporations and lack of 
support from Republican commissioners.  Id. at 65–66. 
 49 Fisch, supra note 24, at 65–66. 
 50 Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l Group, 462 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that shareholders can introduce proxy access proposals under Rule 14a-8). 
 51 Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Solicitations of Proxies, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-8 (2008). 
 52 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2009).  The legislature also adopted a provision authorizing bylaws that 
provide for reimbursement of a shareholder’s proxy solicitation expenses.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113(a) 
(2009). 
 53 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 232, 240, 249, 274 (2009). 
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procedure adopted in England in 2002, provides for an annual advisory 
shareholder vote on the compensation packages paid to top corporate 
executives.54  Institutional investors have introduced shareholder proposals 
seeking say-on-pay at a substantial number of companies.55  Some of these 
proposals have received majority support,56 and several companies have 
already implemented say-on-pay.57  Furthermore, Congress may implement 
some form of say-on-pay requirement, either directly through legislation or 
indirectly via an SEC rule.58  The House approved a say-on-pay bill in 2007,59 
and President Obama has indicated his support for such legislation.60  
Similarly, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 200861 required 
companies receiving financial assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program to permit a shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation.62 
Viewed in the context of the increasing importance of the shareholder 
franchise, claims about proxy advisor power paint a frightening picture.  A few 
entities with limited accountability and broad discretion control a huge portion 
of the shareholder vote.  And the shareholder vote they control influences an 
ever-increasing range of issues. 
 
 54 Fisch, supra note 37, at 71 (describing say-on-pay). 
 55 See, e.g., Robert Kropp, Shareowner Resolutions on Say on Pay Gain Widespread Support, May 6, 
2009, http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi?sfArticleId=2690 (reporting that seventy-nine say-on-pay 
resolutions were introduced in 2008, and more than one hundred have been filed in 2009). 
 56 According to a preliminary count, as of May 2009, ten of the twenty-nine proposals that came up for a 
vote received majority support.  Press Release, AFSCME, Say on Pay Shareholder Proposals Garner Record 
Support During Tumultuous Shareholder Season (May 4, 2009). 
 57 See, e.g., Editorial, Stockholders Should Demand a Say on Executive Pay, SEATTLE TIMES, May 14, 
2009, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorialsopinion/2009221158_editb15sayonpay.html 
(noting that resolutions had been approved by fifteen companies this year and that Hewlett-Packard and 
Occidental Petroleum had agreed to adopt say-on-pay without a shareholder vote); SmartPros.com, Say-On-
Pay Is on the Way, http://accounting.smartpros.com/x65641/xml (last visited Feb. 7, 2010) (listing Occidental 
Petroleum, Intel, Hewlett-Packard, MBIA, Motorola, and Ingersoll-Rand as companies that have adopted say-
on-pay). 
 58 See Lawrence Bard et al, Morrison Foerster, Administration Proposals on Compensation Committees 
and Say on Pay Would Affect All Public Companies, July 30, 2009, http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/ 
15793.html (describing the Treasury Department’s draft legislation that would require the SEC to adopt rules 
mandating say-on-pay for all publicly traded companies). 
 59 Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. §2 (2007); Shareholder 
Vote on Executive Compensation Act, S. 1181, 110th Cong. §2 (2007). 
 60 Stephen Taub, Obama Pushes Say on Pay Legislation, CFO.COM, Apr. 11, 2008, http://www.cfo.com/ 
article.cfm/11037327/c_11036422 (reporting then-Senator Obama’s support for say-on-pay). 
 61 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110343, 122 Stat. 3765, 110th Cong. 
(2008). 
 62 Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation of TARP Recipients, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-61335, 75 Fed. Reg. 2789 (Jan. 12, 2010) (describing requirement of Section 111(e) of the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and amending federal proxy rules to implement the requirement). 
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Yet, despite the assertions that proxy advisors are powerful, little 
systematic study of their actual influence on shareholder votes has been 
conducted.  Only a handful of academic papers analyze ISS recommendations 
empirically.  In one article, Jennifer Bethel and Stuart Gillian63 examine votes 
on shareholder proposals during the 1998 proxy season.  Bethel and Gillan 
conclude that a negative ISS recommendation was associated with 13.6% to 
20.6% fewer shares voted in favor of management proposals.64  Another recent 
paper analyzes the role of ISS recommendations in proxy contests.65  The 
authors find that ISS recommendations have significant explanatory value for 
contest outcomes.66  Finally, Jie Cai, Jacqueline Garner, and Ralph Walking 
examine the factors that determine the percentage of “for” votes cast in 
uncontested director elections.67  After controlling for several other factors, 
they find that a negative ISS recommendation reduces the vote in favor of 
directors by 19%.68 
These studies, as well as the other less systematic claims about the effect of 
proxy advisors, suffer in varying degrees from two problems.  First, they focus 
only on ISS and do not consider the effect of other proxy advisors on 
shareholder voting.  Second, and more importantly, they fail to deal with the 
issue of what is meant by the “power” or “influence” of proxy advisors.  In 
particular, the studies do not distinguish between correlation and causation.  
Thus, although they demonstrate that proxy advisor recommendations are 
correlated with voting outcomes, they do not fully address the underlying 
factors—firm performance, director attendance, and the like—that are likely to 
influence both the recommendations and the ultimate vote.69 
In this Article, we try to correct for these problems in two ways.  First, we 
examine the relationship between shareholder votes and the recommendations 
of proxy advisors, including not merely ISS, but also Glass Lewis, Proxy 
Governance, and Egan Jones.  (Glass Lewis is reputedly the second most 
influential proxy advisor; Proxy Governance and Egan Jones also provide 
 
 63 Bethel & Gillan, supra note 14, at 29. 
 64 Id. at 46. 
 65 Cindy R. Alexander et al., The Role of Advisory Services in Proxy Voting (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 15143, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/paper/w15143. 
 66 Id. at 34–35. 
 67 See Cai et al., supra note 13. 
 68 Id. at 19. 
 69 The article by Cai and others partially examines other factors that may influence the vote.  See Cai, et 
al., supra note 13. 
CHOIFISCHKAHAN GALLEYSF 7/8/2010  2:55 PM 
2010] THE POWER OF PROXY ADVISORS 879 
proxy advice.)70  Second, we try to disentangle the difference between 
correlation and causation both conceptually and empirically.71 
Part I discusses the distinction between correlation and causation and posits 
four possible relationships between proxy advisor recommendations and the 
subsequent shareholder vote.  Part II describes our dataset and provides 
summary statistics on advisor recommendations and voting outcomes.  Part III 
incorporates factors that, we hypothesize, are likely to influence voting 
outcomes and, using multivariate regression analysis, analyzes the role these 
factors and advisor recommendations play in influencing voting outcomes.  
Part IV focuses on ISS in particular and introduces an alternative methodology 
for measuring ISS’s power by distinguishing institutional voting behavior from 
that of individual retail investors. 
I. CORRELATION AND CAUSATION: FOUR TYPES OF “POWER” 
Proxy advisor recommendations may correlate with the shareholder vote 
for four conceptually distinct reasons.  First, the same director nominee and 
company characteristics may independently influence both the proxy advisors’ 
recommendation and the shareholder vote.  Second, proxy advisors may gather 
information that investors use to make their voting decisions.  Third, investors 
may select a proxy advisor based on their ex ante agreement with the bases 
upon which the advisor formulates its recommendations.  Finally, investors 
may view the advisor’s recommendation alone as a basis for deciding how to 
vote, independent of the underlying factors upon which that recommendation is 
based.  It is only this last reason that can truly be characterized as causality. 
There is reason to believe a substantial overlap exists between the factors 
that proxy advisors consider important and those that matter to voters.  To 
start, there is extensive corporate governance literature examining board 
composition and effectiveness.72  Although precise specifications of the 
 
 70 See GAO, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER, supra note 1, at 7 (describing ISS, Glass Lewis, Proxy 
Governance, and Egan Jones as among the “five major firms” comprising the proxy advisory industry).  The 
fifth firm included in the GAO report is Marco Consulting Group (MCG), which provides investment 
consulting services to Taft-Hartley funds and a number of public benefit plans but does not publicly issue 
voting recommendations.  See Marco Consulting, Company History, http://www.marcoconsulting.com/1.2. 
html (last visited May 5, 2010) (“MCG only provides investment consulting and proxy voting services.”). 
 71 We explore the relationship between these factors and proxy advisor recommendations in a prior 
article.  Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 
S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 650–51 (2009). 
 72 See, e.g., Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: 
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characteristics that increase director effectiveness are difficult to identify, 
many commentators agree on baseline attributes.73  In addition, while 
shareholders may be dissatisfied with a board of directors for many reasons, 
common reasons for concern include poor financial performance; corporate 
misconduct, such as securities fraud; excessive executive compensation; and a 
lack of responsiveness to shareholders.74 
In an earlier article, we examined the relationship between these factors and 
proxy advisor recommendations in uncontested director elections.75  In 
particular, we examined the effect on recommendations of twenty-three 
factors, including director-specific factors such as age and attendance, and 
firm-specific factors such as financial performance, the existence of 
antitakeover defenses, and the board’s failure to implement a previously 
approved shareholder proposal.  We found that the majority of our factors 
affected the likelihood that at least one proxy advisor would issue a withhold 
recommendation—although firm antitakeover defenses did not seem to play a 
significant role.  Moreover, while all of the proxy advisors considered a few 
specific factors important—such as poor director attendance—on most issues 
there was substantial variation.  For example, ISS was significantly more likely 
to issue a withhold recommendation when the company board had refused to 
 
Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 921–39 (1996) (collecting empirical studies of board 
composition and effectiveness); cf. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 263 (2002) (finding no correlation 
between director independence and long-term firm performance). 
 73 These include director independence both from the company and the CEO, limited service on other 
corporate boards, and regular attendance at board meetings.  See, e.g., In the Matter of the Walt Disney Co., 
Exchange Act Release No. 50882 (Dec. 20, 2004) (“The independence of directors is a linchpin of sound 
corporate governance, and is crucial to the objective oversight of management.”); PAUL W. MACAVOY & IRA 
M. MILLSTEIN, THE RECURRENT CRISIS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 22–23 (2003) (stating that directors 
should act “independently of management”); Stephen P. Ferris et al., Too Busy to Mind the Business? 
Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments, 58 J. FIN. 1087 (2003) (finding no evidence, 
contrary to popular wisdom, that multiple directors shirk their responsibilities); Renée B. Adams & Daniel 
Ferreira, Regulatory Pressure and Bank Directors’ Incentives to Attend Board Meetings 304 (European 
Corporate Governance Inst. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 203/2008, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=936261 (discussing various directives that directors attend board meetings regularly).  
The federal proxy rules require issuers to disclose whether any director has attended fewer than 75% of the 
board meetings held during the prior fiscal year.  Schedule 14A. Information Required in Proxy Statement, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 7(f) (2009).  The rules also require disclosure of outside directorships.  Schedule 
14A. Information Required in Proxy Statement, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 22(b) (2009). 
 74 See, e.g., Mark Anderson, Eli Lilly Heads CalPERS’ ‘Underperforming’ List, SACRAMENTO BUS. J., 
Mar. 19, 2009, http://sacramento.bizjournals.com/sacramento/stories/2009/03/16/daily56.html (describing 
CalPERS’s (the California Public Employees’ Retirement System) watch list as targeting companies with 
corporate governance defects that also “show weakness with profitability, transparency and/or management”). 
 75 See Choi, Fisch & Kahan, supra note 71, at 650–51. 
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implement a shareholder resolution that had received majority shareholder 
support.  Glass Lewis was significantly more likely to issue a withhold 
recommendation if the nominee was an inside director (other than the CEO).  
Egan Jones was significantly more likely to issue a withhold recommendation 
if the nominee was a board member at three or more other major companies.  
Proxy Governance was significantly more likely to issue a withhold 
recommendation if the company CEO received abnormally high 
compensation.76 
We found a substantial correlation between proxy advisor 
recommendations and the factors that academics, policy makers, and the media 
have identified as important.  This correlation challenges the view that ISS and 
the other proxy advisors are causally significant in determining the shareholder 
vote because shareholders may themselves directly consider these factors 
important.  To the extent that the same factors independently affect both 
shareholders’ voting behavior and the proxy advisor’s recommendation, 
shareholder votes and recommendations will be correlated.  However, the 
recommendation will not be the cause of the shareholder vote.  Any power or 
influence inferred from such a correlation would be illusory.77 
Of course, proxy advisors may be the source of the information underlying 
shareholder voting decisions.  When proxy advisors issue recommendations, 
they provide more than a bottom line—more than a mere vote “for” or 
“withhold.”  Proxy advisors also provide additional information about the basis 
for their recommendation.78  For example, a proxy advisor may explain that it 
issued a withhold recommendation because the director is a member of a board 
that failed to implement a shareholder resolution adopted with majority 
shareholder support.  Thus, a shareholder who cares about responsiveness to 
such resolutions, but has neither the time nor the interest to research whether 
the resolution won majority support and, if so, whether it has been 
implemented, may obtain that information from the proxy advisor’s report.  
The relevant underlying information is generally available to the public, but as 
long as the shareholder is not willing to conduct the requisite research, the 
proxy advisor’s report is likely to become the exclusive source of information 
relevant to shareholder voting decisions.  Under this circumstance, had the 
 
 76 Id. at 664–70. 
 77 Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 945, 945 (1986). 
 78 See, e.g., ISS Governance Services, Proxy Alert, Citigroup Inc. 18 (Apr. 10, 2009) (stating that ISS 
recommends shareholders withhold their votes for board nominee Anne Mulcahy because she may be 
overextended as she sits on more than three boards and serves as CEO of Xerox Corporation). 
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shareholder not subscribed to the services of the advisor, the shareholder 
would not have learned of the information. 
In such a case, the proxy advisor may well be the “but for” cause of the 
shareholder vote.  Nonetheless, it still may be inappropriate to attribute the 
shareholder’s voting decision to the “power” of the proxy advisor.  The advisor 
is acting as a mere information agent.  The underlying information provided by 
the proxy advisor—not the bottom-line conclusion—is what affects the 
shareholder vote. 
The proxy advisor nonetheless exercises power as an information agent by 
selecting, in its discretion, which information to report.  For example, a proxy 
advisor could, as a general matter, choose not to provide any information on 
whether a board failed to implement a shareholder proposal, or it could provide 
this information selectively.79  In either case, assuming that shareholders do not 
otherwise obtain the underlying information, the proxy advisor is exercising 
some power over the shareholder vote.  In sum, to the extent that the 
information provided by a proxy advisor affects the shareholder vote, the 
proxy advisor has some limited influence, but inferring from this correlation 
that the advisor has power over the shareholder vote is an overstatement. 
Alternatively, some institutional investors may just look at the bottom line 
of the proxy advisor and vote accordingly.  That is, shareholders may rely on 
the proxy advisor’s assessment of the underlying information, rather than 
evaluating that information themselves.80  Even in such cases, however, the 
extent of the proxy advisor’s power may be overstated.  At least some 
 
 79 For example, the proxy advisor could provide information on the board’s failure to implement a 
shareholder proposal only when the advisor was recommending a withhold vote and not when the advisor was 
recommending a vote in favor of the nominees.  In theory, proxy advisors could also misreport information.  
The ability of advisors to exercise power consistently by misreporting is quite limited, however.  In addition to 
the market competition provided by other advisors, the company itself has a strong incentive to correct 
inaccuracies, and the media is likely to report any substantial errors.  Thus proxy advisors have incentives to 
avoid recommendations that can be described as erroneous.  Indeed, ISS received substantial adverse media 
attention for its recommendation that shareholders withhold their votes from Warren Buffett, a nominee to the 
Coca-Cola board, because of business relationships between Coca-Cola and some Berkshire Hathaway 
subsidiaries.  See, e.g., Donald E. Graham, The Gray Lady’s Virtue, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2007, at A17, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117728391033378436.html (describing ISS’s recommendation as 
“perhaps the single silliest recommendation ever made to shareholders”). 
 80 The proxy voting guidelines of the Nathan Cummings Foundation, for example, reflect this role for the 
proxy advisor, indicating that the Foundation will vote for a director nominee if the company does not have a 
staggered board, if the company is not recommending against an issue proposal supported by the Foundation, 
and if RiskMetrics supports the nominee.  Proxy Voting Practices, The Nathan Cummings Foundation, 
available at http://www.nathancummings.org/shareholders/pvgandvr/VotingGuidelines.pdf. 
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investors will have substantial information about proxy advisors’ 
recommendations and the bases on which they are issued, and they may choose 
to follow the recommendations of an advisor because they have concluded that 
they usually agree with the proxy advisor’s decisions.  Proxy advisors prepare 
and distribute annual explanations of their voting policies to their clients, 
identifying the factors that they consider important.81  Recognizing that 
different institutions potentially have different objectives (primarily with 
respect to shareholder resolutions), ISS in fact now offers different guidelines 
tailored to the needs of union pension funds, public pension funds, and socially 
responsible institutional investors.82  For most of these institutional investors, 
many of which hold securities in hundreds or even thousands of issuers, the 
most efficient way of deciding how to vote is to determine which proxy 
advisor has a voting policy they most agree with and then to follow its 
recommendations. 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that institutions sometimes choose to 
follow an advisor that has adopted certain voting policies to further their 
business interests.  For example, according to the SEC, INTECH, an 
investment advisor, switched to ISS’s union fund voting guidelines in an effort 
to generate more advisory business from union funds.83  While this may reflect 
a conflict of interest between INTECH and its clients,84 it also indicates that 
the choice of advisor is correlated with the advisor’s voting policies. 
To the extent that an institutional investor chooses a proxy advisor based 
on its voting policies, the proxy advisor exercises a degree of power, but this 
power is contingent in two respects.  First, the power derives from an ex ante 
assessment by the advisor’s client that it is in general agreement with the way 
the proxy advisor makes the recommendations.  Second, to the extent that the 
client ceases to be in agreement—because the client’s view (or its business 
 
 81 See, e.g., ISS GOVERNANCE SERVICES, 2008 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY (2007), 
available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/2008PolicyUSSummaryGuidelines.pdf. 
 82 RiskMetrics, Proxy Advisory Services, http://www.riskmetrics.com/proxy_advisory/options (last 
visited Aug. 11, 2009) (describing different voting guideline options). 
 83 See Thompson Hine, SEC Enters Order Against Adviser Related to Proxy Voting, May 22, 2009, 
http://www.thompsonhine.com/publications/publication1818.html (describing SEC action); Press Release, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Investment Adviser for Proxy Voting Rule Violations (May 8, 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-105.htm. 
 84 The SEC noted that the INTECH decision created a potential conflict of interest in that “not all clients 
would agree with votes made pursuant to the ISS-PVS Guidelines and that voting proxies pursuant to the ISS-
PVS Guidelines would benefit INTECH in obtaining and retaining union-affiliated clients.”  Thompson Hine, 
supra note 83. 
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objective) has changed, because the advisor’s methodology has changed, or 
because the client believes that there is a different advisor whose 
recommendations coincide with the client’s views more closely—the client 
may switch to another proxy advisor. 
The degree of contingent power held by a proxy advisor depends on the 
nature of competition in the market for proxy advisory services.  An increase 
in the number of proxy advisory firms, the extent to which the 
recommendations of different advisors vary, and the transparency of the bases 
of these recommendations will each increase the ability of an institution to 
achieve a closer match between its voting preferences and the 
recommendations of an advisor.85  To the extent the market for proxy advisory 
services is sufficiently competitive, market forces will discipline proxy 
advisors to make recommendations that conform to the preferences of current 
and potential clients.  Indeed, this analysis suggests that those proxy advisors 
who appear to exercise the most power—i.e., those whose recommendations 
are followed most often by shareholders—may have this apparent power not 
because they exercise discretion in making voting recommendations, but rather 
because they base their recommendations on criteria important to their clients.  
To the extent this conclusion is correct, the criticism of proxy advisors as being 
both powerful and unaccountable to shareholders would be substantially 
muted. 
Lastly, some shareholders may not care about how they vote their shares.  
They may lack the resources, time, or expertise to evaluate voting decisions, or 
they may engage in an investment strategy in which the outcome of 
shareholder voting is irrelevant.  Although some such investors simply refrain 
from voting,86 others are legally required to make an informed vote.87  
Subscribing to a proxy advisor and, in some cases, delegating complete voting 
authority to that advisor,88 may be the most cost effective way of complying 
 
 85 See GAO, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER, supra note 1, at 13–14 (describing the market for proxy 
advisory services). 
 86 William Baue, Report Urges Foundations to Vote Their Proxies, SOCIAL FUNDS, Mar. 4, 2004, 
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/1358.html (describing the low level of proxy voting by 
foundations and suggesting purchasing proxy voting service from ISS as a superior and reasonably priced 
alternative to refraining from voting). 
 87 See Rose, supra note 16, at 897–98 (noting Department of Labor and SEC regulations). 
 88 See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of 
Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 324 (2008) (reporting that 20% of 
public pension funds surveyed reported delegating complete voting authority to ISS or a similar organization). 
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with that requirement.89  To the extent that the choice of the proxy advisor is 
unrelated to the voting recommendations it issues, a proxy advisor may have 
absolute power.  The advisor may base its recommendations on factors that it 
(or its staff) considers important and would face no short- or long-term 
pressure to modify these factors because they do not mesh with the interests of 
its clients.  The causal power of proxy advisors to affect a shareholder vote is 
strongest in this last form of proxy advisor influence.  Note, however, that even 
this absolute power is limited as long as a proxy advisor has other clients who 
will periodically review its recommendations to determine whether they 
coincide with their interests, and the advisor issues the same recommendation 
to both sets of clients. 
II. ADVISOR RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE SHAREHOLDER VOTE 
We now proceed to examine the power of proxy advisors empirically.  Our 
dataset examines uncontested director elections in 2005 and 2006.  We focus 
only on director elections for companies listed in the S&P 1500 as of June 30 
for the year prior to the director election (June 30, 2004 and June 30, 2005, 
respectively).  For each director in our sample of S&P 1500 companies, we 
collected information about whether the director received a “for” or withhold 
recommendation (or no recommendation) from ISS, Glass Lewis, Egan Jones, 
and Proxy Governance.90 
Table 1, Panel A presents some summary statistics on the coverage rates 
and recommendations of the four proxy advisors.  ISS, Glass Lewis, and Egan 
Jones provided extensive coverage, issuing recommendations on 88% to 99% 
of the director nominees in the sample.  Proxy Governance, by contrast, 
provided much more limited coverage—issuing recommendations on only 
34% of the director nominees in the sample. 
 
 89 The SEC has specifically stated that investment advisors can comply with their fiduciary obligations 
by using a ‘“predetermined voting policy,’ such as a third-party proxy voting service’s platform, to vote 
proxies provided that the predetermined policy is ‘designed to further the interests of clients rather than the 
adviser.’”  INTECH Inv. Mgmt. LLC, Investment Advisers Act Rel. No. 2872, at 5 (May 7, 2009) (quoting 
Final Rule: Proxy Voting by Investment Managers, Investment Advisers Act Rel. No. 2106 (Jan. 31, 2003)), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/ia-2872.pdf. 
 90 Institutional Shareholder Services recommendations were obtained through LEXIS.  Glass Lewis, 
Egan Jones, and Proxy Governance provided us with their recommendations for the period in question.  All of 
the companies in our sample that conducted a director election in 2005 had a proxy advisor recommendation 
for at least one of their directors. 
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The advisors also differed significantly in their proclivity to issue a 
withhold recommendation.  Institutional Shareholder Services issued such 
recommendations for only 6.8% of the directors it covered, and Proxy 
Governance issued even fewer withholds at 3.7% of its recommendations.  By 
contrast, Glass Lewis’s withholds accounted for 18.8% of its 
recommendations, and for Egan Jones, withholds accounted for 11%.  Panel B 
presents a correlation matrix of the recommendations made by the proxy 
advisors.  The correlation is uniformly positive, but low, indicating that 
advisors make different decisions about whether to issue a withhold 
recommendation. 
These findings—together with the findings in our prior article that proxy 
advisors base their recommendations on different factors91—highlight that 
institutional investors have a real choice in selecting proxy advisors.  They can 
pick among advisors that differ both in how critical they are of board nominees 
(as demonstrated by the overall rate of their withhold recommendations) and in 
the criteria they use to assess those nominees.  As a result, even institutions 
that do not want to examine the bases for recommendations on a case-by-case 
basis can nonetheless choose an advisor, or combination of advisors, to match 
their preferences. 
Table 1, Panels C and D, explore the general correlation between withhold 
recommendations and the subsequent shareholder vote by providing data on 
the relationship between the recommendations and the vote outcome.  Panel C 
shows the average percentage of  “for” votes92 when a proxy advisor has issued 
a “for” and a “withhold” recommendation.  The last column of that table 
displays the difference in these percentages as the marginal impact of a 
withhold recommendation.  As Panel C shows, an ISS withhold 
recommendation is associated with a 20.3% drop in the “for” vote.  This drop 
reflects a far higher percentage than for any of the other advisors.  For Glass 
Lewis, the drop is 6.2%, and for Egan Jones and Proxy Governance, it is 4.7% 
and 3.5% respectively.  The data in this table are consistent with the press 
characterizations of ISS as the most powerful and Glass Lewis as the second 
most powerful proxy advisor,93 and the marginal impact is within the range of 
 
 91 See Choi, Fisch & Kahan, supra note 71, at 649. 
 92 Percentage “for” vote is defined as the “for” votes as a percentage of the sum of “for” and withhold 
votes. 
 93 See supra text accompanying notes 9–12. 
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votes—albeit at the lower end—that media and prior academic reports have 
claimed ISS controls.94 
Note, however, that Panel C measures correlation, not causation.  This 
correlation reflects the combined effect of all of the relationships between the 
shareholder vote and the ISS recommendation detailed in Part I above.  Thus, 
the 20% effect of an ISS recommendation may be due to a combination of the 
following: (1) some shareholders conducting an independent analysis and 
voting the way that ISS recommends without considering (or even knowing 
about) the ISS recommendation; (2) some shareholders learning information 
from ISS that affected their own assessment as well as the ISS 
recommendation; (3) some shareholders following ISS based on their general 
assessment of ISS’s voting policies;95 (who may switch if they find that ISS’s 
voting policies in fact do not match their preferences); and (4) some 
shareholders following ISS recommendations without regard to (or without 
having) their own views on the issues. 
In Panel D, we consider the combined effect of recommendations by 
multiple proxy advisors.  For ISS, the marginal impact of a recommendation is 
pretty stable, regardless of what the other proxy advisors do—ranging from 
17.6% to 21.4% depending upon whether another advisor (and which advisor) 
has issued a “for” or a withhold recommendation.  By contrast, the impact of 
the other advisors seems to decline when the ISS recommendation is taken into 
account.  Thus, holding the ISS recommendation constant, withhold 
recommendations by Egan Jones and Proxy Governance affect less than 2% of 
the vote.  A withhold recommendation by Glass Lewis retains its earlier effect 
(6.2% in Panel C compared to 6.5% in Panel D) when ISS also issued a 
withhold recommendation.  But the marginal impact of a Glass Lewis withhold 
recommendation is only 3.6% of the vote when ISS issues a “for” 
recommendation.  In sum, when we combine the recommendations, the ISS 
effect clearly dominates those of the other advisors.  Although not conclusive, 
these data suggest either that ISS’s recommendations are more closely aligned 
with shareholders’ preferences, that other proxy advisors are far less influential 
than ISS, or both. 
Table 1, Panel E presents data on the distribution of shareholder votes.  In 
2005 and 2006, most directors were elected with a very high vote margin—an 
 
 94 See supra text accompanying notes 12–16. 
 95 These shareholders may switch if they find that ISS’s voting policies in fact do not match their 
preferences. 
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unsurprising outcome given that we examined uncontested elections during an 
economic bubble in a period when broker discretionary voting was permitted.96  
For 72% of the nominees, the margin is 95% or more of the vote, and for 89% 
of the nominees, the margin exceeds 90%.  Only 4% of the nominees received 
a “for” vote of less than 80%.  It is important to remember that, in uncontested 
elections, shareholders make a significant statement simply by withholding a 
higher percentage of votes than normal.  Thus, given that the average “for” 
vote is 95%, a “for” vote of 80% could be considered a rebuff or an 
embarrassment to a director.97  Indeed, issuers have become increasingly 
responsive to substantial (but less than majority) withhold votes, even though 
such votes have no direct impact on the composition of the board.98 
III.  INDEPENDENT FACTORS AFFECTING THE SHAREHOLDER VOTE 
We now probe further into the effect of underlying firm and director factors 
and advisor recommendations on vote outcomes.  As in our prior research, we 
collected information about various publicly available factors that, based on 
corporate governance literature, we posit may influence the shareholder vote.  
We obtained data regarding the characteristics of both individual director 
nominees and the company for which the director was being nominated.  With 
respect to individual directors, we obtained data99 on: (1) whether the director 
was the CEO (CEO), a non-executive chairman (Chairman Only), an employee 
of the company other than the CEO (Empl_Dir), an outside director with 
certain links to the company (OutDirLink), or a new Director (New Director); 
(2) whether the director was a member of the audit committee (AuditMbr), the 
compensation committee (CompMbr), or the nominating committee 
 
 96 See infra text accompanying note 135.  Since 2006, the number of directors with high withhold votes 
has increased.  See GEORGESON, supra note 36, at 7 (describing the increase in the number of high withhold 
votes). 
 97 GEORGESON, supra note 36, at 7 (charting the number of directors who received a withhold vote of 
20% or more). 
 98 See Cai et al., supra note 13, at 2390; Diane Del Guercio et al., Do Boards Pay Attention When 
Institutional Investor Activists “Just Vote No”?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 84 (2008) (finding operating performance 
improvement and increased CEO turnover in response to successful “vote no” campaigns). 
 99 These data were obtained from the RiskMetrics-Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) 
director database, available to subscribers of Wharton Research Data Services.  The IRRC dataset consists of 
data on individual board directors from 1996 to 2006.  The data include “a range of variables related to 
individual board directors (e.g., name, age, tenure, gender, committee memberships, independence 
classification, primary employer and title, number of other public company boards serving on, shares owned, 
etc.).”  See RiskMetrics-Directors Legacy Data Request, Wharton Research Data Services (on file with 
authors). 
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(NomMbr); and (3) whether the director was a member of at least three other 
“major” company boards during the year prior to the annual meeting date 
(ManyBds),100 whether the director attended less than 75% of the director 
meetings (Attendance), whether the director held at least 20% of the 
company’s stock (BlockDir), whether the director was an interlocking director 
(Interlock), and whether the director was 75 years or older (Age75). 
For each company in our sample, we obtained data101 on (1) whether the 
first public report of a restatement to the company’s financial statement 
occurred within two years prior to the annual meeting (Prior Restat), whether 
the first public statement of an SEC investigation or enforcement action 
occurred within two years prior to the annual meeting (Prior SEC), and 
whether the company rejected an issue proposal that had received majority 
shareholder support in the last year (IP No); (2) whether the company had a 
classified board (ClassBd), a poison pill (PPill), cumulative voting (CumVote), 
or golden parachutes (GP); (3) whether the company was in the top or bottom 
5% of the companies ranked based on the abnormal holding period return for 
the three-year period prior to the meeting date for the year of the 
recommendation (Top5AbRet, Bot5Abret);102 and (4) whether the CEO for the 
company was in the top 5% for total excess compensation (Top5AbComp).103 
We hypothesize that all factors other than new director, CEO, non-
executive chairman, and top 5% abnormal return are associated with a decline 
in “for” votes for a particular director.  As most shareholders typically vote for 
a company’s nominees in an uncontested election,104 it is likely that withhold 
votes are triggered by specific problems with a particular director or the 
 
 100 We use the IRRC data on other “major” company boards held by directors for the year prior to the 
annual meeting. 
 101 These data were obtained from SEC filings, press releases, the IRRC Governance database, the 
Georgeson Annual Corporate Governance Reviews, and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  
All of the data are publicly available or based on publicly available sources. 
 102 The abnormal return is defined as the difference between the raw three-year holding period return for 
the company in question and the three-year holding period return for the CRSP value weighted market index. 
 103 Top5AbComp is an indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the total excess compensation for the 
CEO for the company in question is in the top 5% of the sample and 0 otherwise.  We define total excess CEO 
compensation as the difference between the total CEO compensation for the year prior to the meeting date (as 
provided by the Compustat Executive Compensation database) minus the expected total CEO compensation.  
We calculate the expected total CEO compensation by (1) estimating an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model 
for: ln(Total CEO compensation) = α + β1ln(Market_Capitalization) +β2One_Year_Abnormal_Holding_ 
Period_Return + β3Year_2006 + ε and (2) using the predicted Total CEO compensation based on this model as 
the expected Total CEO compensation. 
 104 See, e.g., GEORGESON, supra note 36, at 8 (reporting that, in 2008, only thirty directors at S&P 1500 
companies failed to receive a majority of “for” votes, compared to fifteen directors in 2007). 
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company as a whole.  Directors who may not perform their duties as 
effectively as other directors (due to low attendance, posts on multiple boards, 
or old age) may receive a greater proportion of withhold votes.  Shareholders 
may look negatively on directors who lack independence or have conflicts of 
interest (including employee directors other than the CEO, outside directors 
with linked affiliations with the company, directors with substantial block 
shareholdings, and directors that have interlocking board relationships with the 
company).  Company problems such as poor performance, a restatement, or an 
SEC investigation may trigger a withhold vote, as may a lack of board 
responsiveness to investors, indicated by the failure to adopt a shareholder-
approved issue proposal.  Shareholders, particularly institutional investors, 
may also view the presence of antitakeover mechanisms as a lack of board 
responsiveness. 
We also hypothesize that shareholders tailor their voting to hold directors 
who sit on key committees more responsible for certain problems.  Thus 
shareholders may be more likely to hold members of audit committees 
responsible for audit-related problems, or they may be more likely to withhold 
votes from members of the compensation committee if a company overpays its 
CEO. 
We view shareholder voting for a CEO-director as categorically different.  
A significant withhold vote on the CEO may both send a strong signal of 
dissatisfaction (because the CEO, in many ways, personifies the current 
management policy of the company), but it may also entail greater costs 
(leading to the CEO’s resignation, possibly without a successor in place).  We 
hypothesize a decreased likelihood of a withhold recommendation for new 
directors because shareholders are not likely to hold them responsible for prior 
problems.  We also hypothesize a decreased likelihood of a withhold 
recommendation for non-executive chairmen because they are likely both to 
reflect company responsiveness to shareholder demands and to be selected for 
factors valued by shareholders such as expertise and independence.  For 
obvious reasons, we similarly hypothesize a decreased likelihood of withhold 
recommendations for directors of companies that rank in the top 5% of 
abnormal return. 
In Table 2, we present some summary statistics about the distribution of 
these variables as well as a univariate analysis of the relationship between 
these variables and the voting outcome.  For the variables for which we had a 
prediction, all but five yield a statistically significant difference in the vote 
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outcome in the predicted direction.  The remaining five variables (audit 
committee membership, chairman only, cumulative vote, golden parachute, 
and top abnormal returns) do not yield a statistically significant difference. 
The results of the univariate analysis, however, should be viewed with care.  
This is especially true for the variables associated with board or employment 
status (CEO; membership on the audit, compensation, or nominating 
committee; chairman only; employee director; and outside-linked director) 
because these variables are negatively correlated with each other.  For 
example, a CEO cannot also be a chairman-only, an employee director, or an 
outside-linked director.  As the key committees tend to consist only of 
independent directors, a CEO or an employee director will generally not be on 
the audit, compensation, or nominating committee.105  Additionally, given 
some notion of fair distribution of work among outside directors, a director 
generally does not serve on more than one of these committees at the same 
time. 
We also hypothesize interactions between these variables.  Specifically, we 
hypothesize: (1) that the presence of audit and disclosure-related problems 
(prior audits or restatements) may have a particularly strong adverse impact on 
members of the audit committee;106 (2) that the presence of compensation-
related problems (abnormally high compensation) may have a particularly 
strong adverse impact on members of the compensation committee;107 (3) that 
an abnormal positive or negative return may have a particularly strong impact 
 
 105 See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 303A.03, 303A.07(b) (2009); NASDAQ, Inc., 
Stock Market Equity Rules § 5605 (Mar. 12, 2009) (describing the composition of the audit committee 
(5605(c)(2)), independent director executive compensation (5605(d)), and independent director oversight of 
director nominations (5605(d))), available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/ 
PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_1_4_2&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F. 
 106 Studies have demonstrated relationships between audit committee composition and audit-related 
problems.  See, e.g., Bradley Pomeroy & Daniel B. Thornton, Meta-Analysis and the Accounting Literature: 
The Case of Audit Committee Independence and Financial Reporting Quality, 17 EUR. ACCT. REV. 305, 310–
11 (2008) (summarizing twenty-seven empirical studies examining the relationship between audit committee 
independence and financial reporting quality); Joseph V. Carcello et al., Audit Committee Financial Expertise, 
Competing Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Earnings Management (Working paper, 2006), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=887512 (finding that “independent audit committee members with financial 
expertise are most effective in mitigating earnings management”). 
 107 See, e.g., Ronald C. Anderson & John M. Bizjak, An Empirical Examination of the Role of the CEO 
and the Compensation Committee in Structuring Executive Pay, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 1323, 1332–36 (2003) 
(discussing compensation committee independence and CEO presence on the compensation committee as 
mechanisms for dealing with potential agency issues in setting CEO pay). 
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on the CEO;108 and (4) that membership on many boards may have a different 
impact on the CEO than on other board members.  (This impact could be more 
positive because it serves as a signal of quality or more negative because of 
concerns that the CEO is spending excess time on non-company business.)  
Table 2.1 reports that the “for” vote outcome correlates significantly with three 
of these interaction terms (Prior Restat x AuditMbr, Prior SEC x AuditMbr, 
and Top5AbComp x CompMbr). 
We will refer to variables and interacted variables other than the vote 
recommendations as “underlying factors.”  Our prior research demonstrates 
that most of these variables (other than those related to takeovers)109 are 
significantly related to a withhold recommendation by at least one proxy 
advisor.110  As at least some proxy advisors base their recommendations on 
these variables, it is plausible that shareholders may give independent weight 
to these factors in determining their votes—either because they have 
independent information about these underlying factors or because they obtain 
this information through the proxy advisor’s analysis.  Finally, even though 
takeover-related factors do not appear to affect the recommendations of proxy 
advisors, we nevertheless include them in our analysis because these factors 
are often identified as important indicators of governance quality,111 may affect 
firm value,112 and are within the control of the board.113 
We next examine (in Table 3) the relationship between the “for” vote 
outcome and our identified, publicly available underlying factors in a 
multivariate model.  We first estimate a regression with a log odds 
 
 108 See, e.g., Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 453–54 
(1988) (finding that firms with independent boards are more likely to remove the CEO on the basis of poor 
stock performance). 
 109 We regard ClassBd, PPill, CumVote, and GP as takeover-related factors. 
 110 See Choi, Fisch & Kahan, supra note 71, at 649. 
 111 See Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003). 
 112 See id. (finding a relationship between equity prices and various corporate governance variables). 
 113 Boards generally can adopt poison pills and golden parachutes without shareholder approval.  See, e.g., 
Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351 (Del. 1985) (holding that the board of directors has the 
power to adopt a poison pill under Delaware law); see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 
946, 953–54 (Del. 1985) (outlining a board’s broad powers to act unilaterally).  In contrast, addition or 
removal of a classified board (otherwise known as a staggered board) or a cumulative voting structure 
typically requires both board and shareholder approval.  See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful 
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 894 (2002) 
(“[D]ismantling [a staggered board] that is in the charter requires both a shareholder vote and a board  
vote . . . .”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 124, 161 (1994) (“[T]he elimination of cumulative voting in a specific firm ordinarily requires 
shareholder approval . . . .”). 
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transformation of the “for” vote outcome as a dependent variable.114  For 
independent variables we use publicly available factors with the following 
additions: We add interaction variables for Prior Restat x AuditMbr, Prior SEC 
x AuditMbr, Top5AbComp x CompMbr, Bot5AbRet x CEO, Top5AbRet x 
CEO, and ManyBds x CEO.  As further controls, we add variables for the 
percentage of shares held by institutional investors (InstHold); the percentage 
of the vote held by all board members (Tot_Dir_Shs); firm size (lmktcap, the 
log of the firm’s market capitalization); risk (sdret, the standard deviation of 
the company’s returns for the one-year period prior to the annual meeting 
date).  We also add a dummy variable for whether the election took place in 
2005 or 2006 (Year06). 
For the base model (reported as Model 1 in Table 3), we do not include any 
proxy advisor recommendations.  In the base model, virtually every underlying 
factor significantly affects the shareholder vote, either on its own or as part of 
an interaction variable.  As predicted, the following are associated with a 
reduced “for” vote: membership on audit, compensation, or nominating 
committees; status as outside-linked or employee director; poor attendance; 
age 75 years or older; a prior SEC investigation; a prior restatement (for audit 
committee members only); payment of abnormally high compensation (for 
compensation committee members only); membership on many boards (for 
non-CEOs); ignoring a shareholder proposal; and abnormally low stock 
returns.  Status as a new director and abnormally high stock returns are each 
associated with an increased “for” vote.  In addition, we find that CEOs get a 
lower percentage of “for” votes than other directors.  With regard to the 
takeover-related factors, only the presence of a classified board is associated 
 
 114 While the vote outcome for any director election is continuous, the vote outcome is bounded by zero 
and one.  Estimating an ordinary least squares model on a bounded dependent variable results in biased 
coefficients.  We employ a log odds transformation of the vote outcome to generate an unbounded, continuous 
variable allowing for ordinary least squares estimation of the relationship between the vote outcome and our 
independent variables of interest.  We compute the log odds of the vote outcome as follows: For the dependent 
variable for a particular proxy advisor, we compute a term X = 0.5/n, where n is the number of data points 
where “for” vote data exists for directors with a recommendation from the particular proxy advisor in question.  
We then use the log((VOTE + X)/(1-VOTE + X)) as the dependent variable (to avoid division by zero problems 
when the “for” vote fraction is equal to 1).   
  To control for the possibility that errors for directors in the same company may be correlated we use 
standard errors clustered by company in the models of Table 3.  Unreported, we re-estimate the base model 
(Model 1 of Table 3) using non-clustered, robust standard errors and obtain similar qualitative results, except 
that both PPill and CumVote are now significant (at the <1% and 10% levels respectively), and Bot5AbRet x 
CEO is insignificant. 
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with a significant decrease in the “for” vote.  No underlying factor is 
significant in the opposite of the predicted direction. 
As with the analysis in Part II, however, the associations in the base 
regressions between the underlying factor variables and the shareholder vote 
reflect correlation, not causation.  Significantly, the impact of these variables 
may be mediated because they affect proxy advisor recommendations rather 
than directly influencing shareholder votes.  We address this issue in Model 2 
by adding an indicator variable for the ISS recommendation (VoteISS): 
assigning a value of 1 if ISS issued a withhold recommendation and 0 if ISS 
issued a “for” recommendation.  In Models 3, 4, and 5, we do the same for 
recommendations by Glass Lewis, Egan Jones, and Proxy Governance. 
Having both the ISS recommendation and the underlying factors in the 
same regression permits us, to some extent, to separate the effects of the two 
types of variables on the election results.  To the extent that the underlying 
factors affect the vote outcome independently of the ISS recommendation—
either because voters pay direct attention to these factors or because voters pay 
attention to other proxy advisors who pay attention to these factors—the effect 
should persist even after controlling for the ISS recommendation.  Indeed, 
when we add the variable for the ISS recommendation, there is almost no 
qualitative distinction between Models 1 and 2 in the significance levels of the 
underlying factors.  All variables retain their statistical significance with the 
exception that one variable (Interlock) that was not significant in the base 
model is now significant at the 10% level (in the predicted direction) in Model 
2.  The levels of significance change from Model 1 to Model 2 for only Prior 
Restat x AuditMbr (which decreases from a 5% to a 10% level) and 
Bot5AbRet x CEO (which increases from a 10% to a 5% level).  To test the 
continuing importance of the underlying factors even with the ISS 
recommendation, we perform an F-test of the joint hypothesis that no 
independent variable except the ISS recommendation variable is significantly 
different from zero.  The p-value of the F-test is 0.0000, which indicates that 
the other independent variables add significance to the explanatory power of 
the “for” vote ordinary least squares model. 
The variable for the ISS recommendation in Model 2 is also highly 
significant.  This provides compelling evidence that the ISS recommendation 
has independent significance—that vote outcome is not driven exclusively by 
the underlying factors included in our regression.  In addition, the magnitude 
of the ISS recommendation variable is higher than any other single variable, 
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and inclusion of the ISS recommendation greatly increases the predictive 
power of the regression (the adjusted R-squared increases from .109 to .185).  
In short, ISS’s recommendation matters. 
A. The Impact of an ISS Recommendation 
Finding that the ISS recommendation matters leads to the next question: 
How much does it matter?  To get a better sense of the quantitative impact of 
the ISS withhold recommendation on the “for” vote percentage, we calculate 
the predicted change in the “for” vote outcome—depending on whether ISS 
makes a “for” or withhold recommendation.  We find that this effect varies 
depending on the overall level of the vote in favor of the director candidate.  
Thus Table 4 reports the effect at various points along the log-odds “for” vote 
distribution.  For example, calculations show that the ISS withhold 
recommendation reduces the predicted “for” vote by 13.1% (from 98.1% to 
85.4%) at the fiftieth percentile of the log-odds “for” vote distribution.115  At 
the twenty-fifth percentile, an ISS withhold recommendation has a stronger 
impact, reducing the predicted “for” vote by 17.0%.  On the other hand, at the 
seventy-fifth percentile, an ISS withhold recommendation has a weaker 
impact, reducing the predicted “for” vote by 10.1%. 
The quantitative impact of the ISS variable reflected in Table 4 likely 
overstates the actual impact of the ISS recommendation.  One of the challenges 
of the multivariate regression models in Table 3 (used to compute the marginal 
impacts reported in Table 4) is that they are incomplete.  Although we have 
endeavored to identify many of the publicly available factors that may 
influence the shareholder vote, it is likely that we have failed to identify and 
control for all such factors.116  This reflects the standard omitted variable 
 
 115 These percentiles were calculated using the actual distribution of all independent variables except the 
variable for the ISS vote recommendation, which was set to zero (the baseline “for” recommendation). 
 116 Research indicates, for example, that shareholders affiliated with the AFL-CIO may consider the 
interests of union workers when voting in director elections.  See, e.g., Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate 
Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting 30 (N.Y.U. Stern Working 
Paper Series, No. FIN-08-006, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1285084 (finding evidence that labor relations affect the voting behavior of some union shareholders).  
Considerations of corporate social responsibility may influence other shareholders.  See Thomas W. Joo, 
Corporate Hierarchy and Racial Justice, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 955, 956–57 (2005) (describing the potential 
role of shareholder power in increasing racial justice and social responsibility).  Shareholders may care about 
the board’s position on current as well as previously submitted shareholder proposals.  See NATHAN 
CUMMINGS FOUND., supra note 80, at 1 (indicating that the Foundation will vote for company nominees if, 
inter alia, “[t]he board does not recommend a vote AGAINST a shareholder proposal that the Foundation 
supports”). 
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problem in regression analyses.  As long as we do not control for these factors, 
the ISS variable will include both the direct effect of the variable and the effect 
of these omitted factors—thus potentially overstating the importance of the ISS 
recommendation in explaining the “for” vote outcome.  The coefficient 
estimates for the VoteISS dummy variable represent the upper bound of any 
direct effect of the ISS recommendation, but the true effect of the ISS 
recommendation may be lower, even much lower. 
The extent to which our model overstates the significance of the ISS 
recommendation depends on how many underlying factors we have omitted 
from the regression, the importance of these factors, and their correlation with 
the ISS recommendation.  In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that 
some of the variables we have identified and used in the regressions are 
imprecise proxies for an actual problem with a director or company.  This is 
true specifically for the variables for CEO status and for membership on the 
audit, compensation, or nominating committee.  For example, shareholders are 
not automatically going to vote against a director because the director is a 
member of the compensation committee (nor is ISS more likely to recommend 
a withhold vote against such a director because of his or her committee 
membership).  Rather, membership on the audit, compensation, or nominating 
committee may result in a withhold vote or withhold recommendation because 
voters or ISS hold the committee responsible for problems under its purview.  
In our regression, we control for only a few potential problems: high CEO 
compensation for compensation committee members; restatements and SEC 
investigations for audit committee members; and performance and membership 
on other boards for CEOs.   
In addition to being underinclusive, our proxies are overinclusive—not 
every restatement reflects adversely on the current audit committee.  More 
generally, given the nature of our empirical analysis and the size of our data 
set, we can include only the factors that are easily available, quantifiable, and 
generalizable across a large number of firms and directors.  Neither proxy 
advisors (which have a sizeable full-time staff) nor shareholders are confined 
in this manner.  We thus expect that our regressions fail to include a large 
number of important underlying factors that presumably also affect the ISS 
recommendation. 
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B. Contingent Versus Absolute Power 
We did not find any variable that was both (i) associated with an increased 
likelihood of an ISS withhold recommendation as reported in our earlier 
article117 and (ii) associated with a reduced “for” vote in the regressions 
reported in Table 3.  Similarly, we did not find any variable that was both (i) 
associated with a reduced likelihood of an ISS withhold recommendation and 
(ii) associated with an increased “for” vote in the regressions reported in Table 
3.  This is true whether or not we control for the ISS recommendation.  Thus, 
we have not identified any factor that ISS views as negative but shareholders 
view as positive (or vice versa).  This, incidentally, is not true for Glass Lewis.  
In our earlier article, we found that Glass Lewis is less likely to issue withhold 
recommendations for CEOs,118 but here we find that CEOs receive a 
significantly higher withhold vote from shareholders than do non-CEOs for all 
the models reported in Table 3. 
Moreover, most of the factors that we identified in our earlier article as 
having a statistically significant impact on the ISS recommendation119 remain 
significant in explaining the voting outcome even after controlling for the ISS 
recommendation in Model 2 of Table 3.  Specifically, the following factors are 
associated with a lower likelihood of a “for” recommendation by ISS and, after 
controlling for the ISS recommendation, with a lower “for” shareholder vote 
percentage: CEO status, membership on the compensation committee, 
abnormal compensation (for compensation committee members), lack of 
attendance, membership on multiple boards (for non-CEOs), membership on 
the nominating committee, status as an employee or outside-linked director, 
ignoring a shareholder proposal, and having a classified board.  New director 
status is associated with a higher likelihood of a “for” recommendation by ISS 
(as identified in our earlier article) and, after controlling for the ISS 
recommendation, a higher “for” vote percentage in Model 2 of Table 3.120  
Furthermore, the four most important factors affecting an ISS 
recommendation—ignoring a shareholder proposal, poor attendance at board 
meetings, status as outside-linked director, and status as employee 
 
 117 Choi, Fisch & Kahan, supra note 71, at 665. 
 118 Id. at 695. 
 119 Id. at 665. 
 120 Only two factors that were significant for the ISS recommendation—status as non-executive chairman 
and golden parachutes, both of which reduced the likelihood of a withhold recommendation—are not 
significant in the vote regressions.  Compare id. at 665, with id. at 671–72. 
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director121—were also among the six most important factors (together with the 
ISS recommendation itself and status as CEO) affecting the vote outcome. 
Institutional Shareholder Services is the only advisor for which CEO status is 
associated with an increased likelihood of a withhold recommendation as 
reported in our earlier article, and it is associated with a reduction in the “for” 
vote percentage in Model 2 of Table 3.  The relationship between the factors 
that independently affect the ISS recommendations and the vote outcome 
suggests that ISS is in sync with the sentiments of shareholders.  In essence, 
ISS generally gives the same directional weight to company and director 
attributes in making its voting recommendation as do shareholders in making 
their voting decisions.122 
The results for the separate regressions involving the other proxy advisors 
(reported in Table 3 as Models 3, 4, and 5) follow the same basic pattern as the 
results for ISS.  Specifically, for each advisor, the dummy variable for a 
withhold recommendation is negative and significant, and most attribute 
variables that were significant in the base regression remain so.  The marginal 
effect of a withhold recommendation by the advisors, calculated in the same 
manner as discussed above for ISS, is reported in Table 4.  In each case, the 
upper-bound estimate of the direct effect is significantly smaller than the 
respective estimate for ISS.  Glass Lewis has a larger upper-bound effect, and 
the estimates for Proxy Governance and Egan Jones are similar to each 
other.123 
The results further suggest that these advisors are less in sync with 
shareholders than ISS.  For example, the four most important factors affecting 
the recommendations of Egan Jones and Proxy Governance do not correspond 
 
 121 Id. at 671–72. 
 122 This alignment is unlikely to be coincidental.  Institutional Shareholder Services explicitly seeks 
shareholder input in formulating its voting policies, surveying institutional investors on a yearly basis.  See 
RISKMETRICS GROUP, 2009–2010 RISKMETRICS POLICY SURVEY 4 (2009) (describing how feedback from 
both institutional investors and issuers is part of RiskMetrics’s annual policy-formulation process). 
 123 As a robustness test, we re-estimated the “for” vote outcomes for Proxy Governance (PGI), Glass 
Lewis (GL), and Egan Jones (EJ) recommendations using a Tobit model.  Unreported, the coefficients on 
VotePGI (-0.025), VoteGL (-0.052), and VoteEJ (-0.037) are all significantly different from zero.  Note that 
the upper bounds of influence for PGI (2.5 percentage points), GL (5.2 percentage points), and EJ (3.7 
percentage points) are again smaller than for ISS.  We also re-estimated the “for” vote outcomes for PGI, GL, 
and EJ recommendations using an OLS model with the untransformed “for” vote outcome as the dependent 
variable.  Unreported, the coefficients on VotePGI (-0.023), VoteGL (-0.050), and VoteEJ (-0.035) are all 
significantly different from zero.  Note that the upper bounds of influence for PGI (2.3 percentage points), GL 
(5.0 percentage points), and EJ (3.5 percentage points) are again smaller than for ISS. 
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closely to the factors affecting the shareholder vote.124  Although ignoring a 
shareholder proposal is an important factor in explaining the shareholder vote 
in all the regressions of Table 3, it is not a significant factor in explaining 
recommendations by Egan Jones and Proxy Governance.125  As to Glass Lewis 
and ISS, the regressions of Table 3 show a significant overlap in the most 
important factors affecting the recommendation.126  But Glass Lewis gives 
strong positive weight to CEO status (i.e., CEOs are less likely to receive a 
withhold recommendation),127 whereas CEO status is associated with a lower 
“for” vote. 
These findings have two implications: First, they suggest that the effect of 
an ISS recommendation, as reflected in our measurements, may include a fair 
degree of contingent power.  Our results indicate that shareholders are basing 
their votes on considerations similar to those that ISS uses in making its 
recommendations, whether shareholders are following ISS’s recommendation 
or not.  Most of the factors we identified as affecting the ISS recommendation 
also independently affect the shareholder vote, and both ISS and shareholders 
consider the same factors as most important.  This allows us to infer that many 
institutions that follow ISS’s recommendations do so because they generally 
agree with the basis for ISS’s voting recommendations.  Second, the findings 
suggest that ISS’s market position, and to a lesser extent Glass Lewis’s market 
position, may be due, at least in part, to the fact that their recommendations 
reflect client views better than those of the other proxy advisors.  While 
catering to clients’ views may explain ISS’s market dominance, it also 
suggests the limits of such dominance—if ISS were to shift its 
recommendations away from the views of its clients, it would likely lose those 
clients to competing advisory firms. 
 
 124 The most important factors affecting Egan Jones’s recommendation are attendance, membership on 
multiple boards, outside-linked status, and membership on the nominating committee.  The most important 
factors for Proxy Governance’s recommendation are attendance, high compensation, membership on the 
compensation committee, and age.  Choi, Fisch & Kahan, supra note 71, at 671–72. 
 125 Id. at 672. 
 126 The four most important factors affecting the ISS recommendation were also among the five most 
important factors accounting for a withhold recommendation for Glass Lewis.  Id. at 671–72.  The fifth Glass 
Lewis factor significantly associated with a withhold recommendation, board interlock, was present only in 
25% of the sample. 
 127 Id. at 671. 
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C. ISS and Glass Lewis 
The data in Table 1, Panels A and B, suggest that the marginal impact of 
Glass Lewis’s recommendations may be affected by the recommendation made 
by ISS.  In Table 5, Panel A, we start with the base model (reported as Model 1 
in Table 3) and include separate indicator variables for the recommendations of 
ISS and Glass Lewis as well as an interacted indicator variable taking the value 
of 1 if both ISS and Glass Lewis issued a withhold recommendation.  In this 
regression, the indicator variable for the ISS recommendation (VoteISS) 
measures the impact of an ISS withhold recommendation on the “for” vote 
outcome when Glass Lewis has issued a “for” recommendation.  Similarly, the 
indicator variable for Glass Lewis (VoteGL) measures the impact of a Glass 
Lewis withhold recommendation on the “for” vote outcome when ISS has 
issued a “for” recommendation.  The sum of the indicator variable for ISS 
(VoteISS) and the interacted indicator variable (VoteISS x VoteGL) measures 
the impact of an ISS withhold recommendation when Glass Lewis has also 
issued a withhold recommendation.  The sum of the indicator variable for 
Glass Lewis (VoteGL) plus the interacted indicator variable (VoteISS x 
VoteGL) measures the impact of a Glass Lewis withhold recommendation 
when ISS has also issued a withhold recommendation. 
In Table 5, Panel A, the variables for both the ISS and Glass Lewis 
recommendations are negative and significant, indicating that a withhold 
recommendation by either advisor reduces the “for” vote percentage.  At the 
median of the log-odds “for” vote distribution, assuming that Glass Lewis has 
issued a “for” recommendation, the predicted change in the “for” vote outcome 
is -14.5 percentage points when ISS issues a withhold recommendation.  In 
contrast, assuming ISS has issued a “for” recommendation, the predicted 
change in the “for” vote outcome is -3.1 percentage points when Glass Lewis 
issues a withhold recommendation.  If ISS issues a withhold recommendation, 
the predicted marginal effect of Glass Lewis also issuing a withhold 
recommendation (the sum of VoteGL and VoteISS x VoteGL) is insignificant.  
However, if Glass Lewis issues a withhold recommendation, the predicted 
marginal effect of ISS also issuing a withhold recommendation (the sum of 
VoteISS and VoteISS x VoteGL) is negative and significant; the predicted 
change in the “for” vote outcome (measured at the mean level of the other 
control variables) is -13.2 percentage points.128 
 
 128 See infra tbl.5, Panel B. 
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These results are consistent with those in the univariate analysis (Table 2) 
and suggest that a Glass Lewis withhold recommendation has a greater impact 
on the vote if ISS has issued a “for” recommendation than if ISS has issued a 
withhold recommendation.  This suggests the possibility that some institutional 
investors automatically will vote in favor of the board’s nominees if both ISS 
and Glass Lewis issue “for” recommendations, but not if one of them issues a 
withhold recommendation.  Alternatively, it may indicate that there are some 
underlying factors that both Glass Lewis and shareholders (but not ISS) 
consider relevant when voting.  The recommendations by the other two proxy 
advisors have only a small, if any, effect on the vote outcome. 
IV.  INSTITUTIONAL VERSUS INDIVIDUAL TEST 
Proxy advisors provide recommendations and supporting research to their 
subscribers, which include mutual funds, pension funds, foundations, and other 
institutional investors.129  Individual shareholders generally do not employ the 
services of these advisors, and advisors typically do not provide public access 
to their recommendations and underlying research.130  In some high profile 
elections such as those involving a proxy contest131 or merger,132 interested 
parties may issue a press release disclosing a proxy advisor’s recommendation.  
It is thus likely that recommendations directly affect only the vote of 
institutional investors (some of which are clients of these advisors), not the 
vote of individual investors (who are not clients). 
We therefore construct a test designed to measure the power of ISS by 
capturing the differential in voting between individual investors and 
institutional investors.  We estimate the base regression (Model 1 of Table 3) 
 
 129 GAO, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER, supra note 1, at 9–10. 
 130 See Alexander, et al., supra note 65, at 8 (“The core business of ISS and other proxy advisors is to 
supply institutional investors with vote recommendations on a subscription basis.”).  Institutional Shareholder 
Services’s recommendations and reports are now available on LEXIS and are also available on Westlaw 
through a premium subscription. 
 131 See, e.g., Press Release, Starboard Value and Opportunity Master Fund Ltd. and Ramius Capital Group 
LLC, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), A Leading Independent Proxy Advisory Firm, Supports 
Ramius’ Independent Nominees for Election to the A. Schulman Board of Directors (Jan. 7, 2008), available 
at http://www.euroinvestor.co.uk/news/story.aspx?id=9692387&bw=20080107005892 (reporting that ISS and 
Glass Lewis supported the appointment of dissident nominees to the A. Schulman Board of Directors).  Media 
reports typically are a response to a press release, and press releases are most common in contested elections. 
 132 See, e.g., Press Release, Arris, ISS and Glass Lewis Each Recommend Merger of ARRIS and C-COR 
(Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.arrisi.com/press_events/press_releases/pressdetail.asp?id=389 
(reporting ISS and Glass Lewis recommendations in favor of proposed merger). 
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by substituting a dummy variable for the recommendation with two interaction 
variables.  First, we multiply a dummy variable for the recommendation 
(VoteISS taking a value of 1 if the ISS recommendation is withhold and 0 if 
the ISS recommendation is “for”) by the fraction of shares held by institutional 
investors (Insthold).  Second, we multiply a dummy variable for the 
recommendation by the fraction of shares held neither by institutional investors 
nor by board members as a proxy for holdings by individual investors 
(Indivhold).133  Given the assumption that individuals do not directly receive 
the ISS recommendation, we posit that any relationship between an ISS 
withhold recommendation and votes by individual investors (Indivhold x 
VoteISS) must be the result of individuals responding to some other observable 
factor that is not directly included in our regressions,134 but for which the ISS 
recommendation in our model acts as a proxy.  We then use the differential 
between Insthold x VoteISS and Indivhold x VoteISS to estimate the effect of 
ISS’s influence on the proxy vote. 
Table 6 reports the results of the regression with the Insthold x VoteISS 
and Indivhold x VoteISS interaction variables.  The coefficients for the 
Insthold x VoteISS interaction terms are more negative than the coefficients 
for the Indivhold x VoteISS interaction terms.  In unreported F-tests, the 
difference in coefficients is significant at the <1% level.  These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that an ISS withhold recommendation has a 
greater impact on voting by institutions than by individuals. 
The results also enable us to estimate the effect of an ISS recommendation.  
We start by making the following three assumptions: First, a recommendation 
affects the vote of some institutional—but not any individual—investors.  
Second, if they did not follow ISS, institutional investors would base their 
votes on the same underlying factors as individual investors.  Third, ISS does 
not provide to its clients any additional information about these underlying 
factors that is not known to individual investors. 
Under these assumptions, the voting record of individual investors is a 
perfect proxy for how institutional investors would vote if ISS did not exist.  
This is so because the votes by individual investors are not themselves affected 
by ISS (first assumption) and because institutions would vote the same way as 
 
 133 “Insthold” is defined as the fraction of outstanding shares of the company in question in the hands of 
institutional investors, measured using Form 13-F data obtained from Thomson Financial for the time period 
immediately prior to the annual meeting date.  “Indivhold” is defined as 1 – InstHold – Tot_Dir_Shs. 
 134 See discussion of potentially omitted variables supra Part III.A. 
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individuals but for ISS (second assumption).  Moreover, any influence of ISS 
is entirely due to its bottom-line recommendation, not to any information and 
analysis accompanying its recommendation (third assumption).  The power of 
ISS thus can be measured by the difference in the coefficients for the 
interaction term with institutional holdings and the interaction term with 
individual holdings (for example, a difference of -1.889 for ISS).  This variable 
will measure any absolute power by ISS as well as any contingent power, but 
only to the extent that ISS clients would have voted differently had they not 
followed ISS. 
Because our dependent variable is the log odds of the “for” vote, we use the 
following methodology to quantify ISS’s power.  We start with the overall 
marginal impact of 13.1 percentage points from an ISS withhold 
recommendation on the base “for” vote model measured at the median of the 
log-odds “for” vote distribution (as reported in Table 4).  We then apportion 
the overall marginal impact of an ISS withhold recommendation between the 
effect on institutional and individual holdings.  For our entire sample, the mean 
fraction of institutional ownership is 0.60, and the mean fraction of individual 
holdings is 0.35.  In the model, the coefficient estimate for Insthold x ISS is -
3.137, and for Indivhold x ISS it is -1.248.  Therefore, we calculate the relative 
contribution of the Insthold x ISS variable on the overall marginal impact of an 
ISS withhold recommendation as (3.137*0.60)/(3.137*0.60 + 1.248*0.35) = 
81.2%.  Stated differently, the marginal impact of an ISS withhold 
recommendation is 10.6 points of the 13.1 overall marginal impact.  The 
relative contribution of the Indivhold x ISS variable is 18.8% (or 2.5 
percentage points of the 13.1 overall marginal impact).  This suggests that an 
ISS withhold recommendation reduces the “for” vote of institutional holders 
by 17.7% (10.6/60) and the “for” vote by individual holders by 7.0 % (2.5/35).  
If, as assumed, the relationship between the ISS recommendation and the vote 
is due to other factors correlated with the ISS recommendation, not the 
recommendation itself, and these factors have the same impact on the 
institutional vote, then the real effect of an ISS withhold recommendation is to 
reduce the institutional “for” vote by 10.7 percentage points of the institutional 
vote.  Multiplying ISS’s relatively greater influence with institutional investors 
(the 10.7 percentage points) by the fraction of votes held on average by 
institutional investors (60% of the votes) yields 6.4 % of the overall vote. 
Note that this result is critically dependent on our foundational 
assumptions.  To the extent that the first assumption is incorrect, and some 
individual investors follow the ISS recommendations (or some institutional 
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investors are misclassified in our data as individuals), our result would 
understate the magnitude of ISS’s power.  We think this is unlikely because 
ISS recommendations are rarely publicized in uncontested elections and 
because individual investors are unlikely to automate their voting decisions.  
Thus, they would only learn of an ISS recommendation through independent 
research. 
To the extent that the second assumption is incorrect and institutional 
investors who follow ISS vote differently from individuals, our result would 
overstate ISS’s power to the degree that institutional investors that follow ISS 
pay more attention to the factors that affect an ISS recommendation than do 
individual investors.  It would also understate ISS’s power to the extent that 
institutional investors that follow ISS would pay less attention to the factors 
that affect an ISS recommendation than do individual investors. 
There are two reasons to believe that the second assumption is at least 
partially incorrect and that it biases our results towards overstating ISS’s 
power.  First, a significant portion of the votes attributed to individuals in our 
methodology are actually brokers’ discretionary votes.135  According to one 
estimate, an average of 19% of all votes cast are broker discretionary votes.136  
Traditionally, brokers exercised their discretionary voting authority in 
accordance with management recommendations, that is, for the board 
nominees.137  Although a few brokers have adopted other voting measures and 
either abstain from voting or vote uninstructed shares in the same proportion as 
shares for which they have obtained voting instructions,138 generally broker 
votes are more favorable to management than shares voted by their beneficial 
owners.139  If one divides the shareholdings of individuals into broker votes—
which are automatically votes “for” each nominee—and remaining shares, the 
 
 135 See discussion of discretionary broker voting in director elections, supra text accompanying notes 29–
34. 
 136 See Allen, supra note 32. 
 137 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1269 
(2008) (“[B]rokers tend to vote in accordance with management recommendations . . . .”). 
 138 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 30 (discussing the shift in some brokers’ voting strategies).  We 
are not aware of any information to suggest that brokers vote the shares of their clients for which they received 
no voting instructions in accordance with ISS recommendations.  Charles Schwab policy dictates that it votes 
securities held in its customers’ brokerage accounts, for which it has not received voting instructions, in 
proportion to “all instructed shares held by Schwab.”  N.Y. STOCK EXCH., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
OF THE PROXY WORKING GROUP TO THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 16 (2006) (describing Schwab’s 
adoption of proportional voting in 2005). 
 139 See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., supra note 138, at 13 (describing the anticipated effect on uncontested director 
elections of eliminating broker discretionary voting). 
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coefficient estimate for the interaction between the ISS recommendation and 
the individual shareholdings not part of such broker votes would be higher than 
the coefficient estimate in Table 6.  Therefore, the estimate of the difference 
between that coefficient and the coefficient for Insthold x VoteISS—the 
measure of ISS’s power—would be lower. 
Second, institutional investors who follow ISS have made an affirmative 
choice to do so.  While some institutions may have followed the ISS 
recommendation as an easy way to satisfy their duty to cast an informed vote, 
others may have done so because they are in overall philosophical agreement 
with the way in which ISS makes voting recommendations.  Even institutions 
that for practical reasons want to follow the recommendations of some advisor 
can choose which advisor to follow.  Thus, it is likely that those institutions 
that choose to follow ISS differ in their voting preferences from—and are 
closer to the voting preference of ISS than—those shareholders who have 
made no such choice. 
Finally, to the extent that our third assumption is incorrect and ISS provides 
additional information to its subscribers that individual investors do not have, 
our estimate of ISS’s power would also include the following two components.  
First, it would include the votes by clients for which ISS acts as a pure 
information agent.  Votes by these investors, as discussed in Part II, are not 
based on the bottom-line ISS recommendation, but rather on the information 
provided by ISS.  Second, our estimate would include the votes by ISS clients 
who base their votes on the ISS recommendation (but not on the information 
provided by ISS), but who would have voted the same way ISS recommended 
if they had known of the additional information provided by ISS. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we analyze the significance of voting recommendations issued 
by proxy advisors.  Our examination includes four advisory firms: ISS, Glass 
Lewis, Egan Jones, and Proxy Governance.  We find, consistent with press 
reports, that ISS is the most powerful proxy advisor.  Of the others, only Glass 
Lewis seems to have a meaningful impact on the shareholder voting. 
We conduct several tests to quantify the impact of an ISS recommendation.  
Although superficial analyses suggest that an ISS recommendation can have a 
marginal impact of as much as 20%, and press reports state that ISS has the 
power to shift 20% to 30% of the shareholder vote, we conclude that these 
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numbers are substantially overstated.  In particular, our findings reveal that 
although an ISS recommendation has independent value, this value is greatly 
reduced once we take into account the company- and firm-specific factors that 
are important to investors.  Depending on the test, we find that the impact of an 
ISS recommendation ranges from 6% to 13% for the median company.  
Overall, we consider it likely that an ISS recommendation shifts 6% to 10% of 
shareholder votes—a material percentage but far less than commonly attributed 
to ISS. 
Furthermore, we find evidence that ISS’s power is partially due to the fact 
that ISS (to a greater extent than other advisors) bases its recommendations on 
factors that shareholders consider important.  This fact and competition among 
proxy advisors place upper bounds on ISS’s power.  Institutional Shareholder 
Services cannot issue recommendations arbitrarily if it wants to retain its 
market position.  Doing so would lead institutional investors to seek the 
services of other proxy advisory firms.  Thus, ISS is not so much a Pied Piper 
followed blindly by institutional investors as it is an information agent and 
guide, helping investors to identify voting decisions that are consistent with 
their existing preferences. 
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Table 1 
Panel A: Coverage and Withhold Rates 
 N Coverage 
Rate 
Number of 
Withhold 
Recs. 
Number 
of “For” 
Recs. 
Withhold Rate 
All 16038 1.00    
ISS 15823 0.99 1073 14750 0.068 
GL 15722 0.98 2956 12766 0.188 
EJ 14147 0.88 1551 12596 0.110 
PGI 5437 0.34 202 5235 0.037 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Recommendations 
 VoteISS VoteGL VoteEJ VotePGI 
VoteISS 1    
VoteGL 0.1683 1   
VoteEJ 0.1803 0.1425 1  
VotePGI 0.1057 0.0736 0.0548 1 
VoteISS equals 1 if ISS gives a Withhold recommendation and 0 if ISS gives a 
“for” recommendation.  VoteGL, VoteEJ, and VotePGI are defined similarly. 
 
Panel C: Recommendation and Percentage “For” Vote—Single Advisor 
 Percentage 
of “For” 
Votes 
(mean) 
Percentage of 
“For” Votes 
where Advisor 
Rec. = 
For (mean) 
Percentage of 
“For” Votes 
where Advisor 
Rec. = Withhold 
(mean) 
Marginal 
Impact 
Total 95.12%    
ISS   96.44% 76.14% 20.3% 
GL   96.25% 90.05% 6.2% 
EJ   95.75% 91.02% 4.73% 
PGI   95.39% 91.90% 3.49% 
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Table 2 
Variable =0  =1    
 N ForVote N ForVote % Difference p-value 
CEO 12566 95.0 1471 95.9 0.9 0.0000 
New Director 13050 94.9 2232 96.6 1.7 0.0000 
AuditMbr 8389 95.0 5564 95.4 0.4 0.0009 
Prior Restat 13441 95.2 1841 94.4 -0.8 0.0000 
Prior SEC 14210 95.2 1072 94.4 -0.8 0.0008 
CompMbr 8585 95.5 5368 94.5 -1.0 0.0000 
Top5AbComp 13870 95.2 707 94.4 -0.8 0.0033 
Attendance 13820 95.2 93 79.3 -15.9 0.0000 
ManyBds 12107 95.2 1280 94.2 -1.0 0.0000 
ManyBds x 
 CEO 
13334 95.2 53 96.7 1.6 0.0977 
Age75 13488 95.2 1794 94.9 -0.3 0.0967 
NomMbr 8460 95.4 5493 94.7 -0.7 0.0000 
Empl_Dir 13065 95.1 888 94.7 -0.4 0.0495 
OutDirLink 12489 95.6 1464 90.7 -4.9 0.0000 
Interlock 13916 95.1 37 92.7 -2.4 0.0366 
Chairman_ 
 Only 
13719 95.1 318 94.9 -0.2 0.5173 
IP No 15136 95.2 146 82.8 -12.4 0.0000 
ClassBd 9459 95.3 5516 94.8 -0.5 0.0000 
PPill 7242 95.4 7733 94.9 -0.6 0.0000 
CumVote 13345 95.1 1630 95.1 0.0 0.8105 
GP 3700 94.9 11275 95.2 0.3 0.0710 
Top5AbRet 14505 95.1 755 95.0 -0.1 0.6463 
Bot5AbRet 14536 95.2 724 93.3 -1.9 0.0000 
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Table 2.1 
Interaction 
Variable =0  =1  
 
 
 
N ForVote N ForVote % 
Difference 
p-value 
Prior Restat x 
AuditMbr 
13305 95.2 648 94.3 -0.8 0.0025 
Prior SEC x 
AuditMbr 
13607 95.1 346 94.4 -0.7 0.0490 
Top5AbComp 
x CompMbr 
13083 95.2 241 92.9 -2.3 0.0000 
Top5AbRet x 
CEO 
13947 95.1 85 95.6 0.5 0.5169 
Bot5AbRet x 
CEO 
13963 95.1 69 94.5 -0.6 0.4434 
The =1 group is where the variable in question is equal to 1 (For example, Prior 
Restat x AuditMbr=1 means the director is a member of the audit committee, and 
the company experienced a first public announcement of an accounting restatement 
within the two years prior to the annual meeting.).  The =0 group is where the 
variable in question is equal to 0. 
The p-value is from a two-sided t-test of the difference in the mean ForVote 
between the =0 and =1 groups for each in the interaction variables. 
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Table 3: “For” Vote Outcome 
Variable Model 1 
No 
Advisor 
Model 2 
ISS 
Model 3 
GL 
Model 4 
EJ 
Model 5 
PGI 
CEO -0.714** -0.648** -0.777** -0.709** -0.574** 
 (-9.84) (-9.20) (-10.73) (-9.54) (-5.93) 
      
New Director 0.335** 0.278** 0.218** 0.295** 0.321** 
 (6.61) (5.61) (4.34) (5.91) (5.11) 
      
AuditMbr -0.251** -0.264** -0.193** -0.201** -0.126* 
 (-5.29) (-5.70) (-4.26) (-4.40) (-1.97) 
      
Prior Restat -0.0961 -0.125 -0.0722 -0.137 -0.226 
 (-0.68) (-0.93) (-0.53) (-0.94) (-1.46) 
      
Prior SEC -0.282** -0.260** -0.234* -0.287** 0.0536 
 (-2.83) (-2.71) (-2.57) (-2.92) (0.36) 
      
Prior Restat -0.235* -0.192+ -0.126 -0.250* -0.119 
x AuditMbr (-2.06) (-1.73) (-1.20) (-2.25) (-0.99) 
      
Prior SEC -0.0959 -0.0914 -0.103 -0.0788 -0.381* 
x AuditMbr (-1.08) (-1.13) (-1.25) (-0.92) (-2.39) 
      
CompMbr -0.381** -0.334** -0.329** -0.354** -0.265** 
 (-8.24) (-7.38) (-7.35) (-7.31) (-4.40) 
      
Top5AbComp -0.105 -0.0690 -0.109 -0.0733 0.00164 
 (-0.66) (-0.51) (-0.69) (-0.46) (0.01) 
      
Top5AbComp -0.462** -0.376** -0.310+ -0.463** -0.493 
x CompMbr (-2.78) (-3.10) (-1.85) (-2.79) (-1.52) 
      
Attendance -1.907** -1.188** -1.272** -1.512** -1.801** 
 (-10.64) (-9.27) (-8.33) (-8.26) (-8.84) 
      
ManyBds -0.394** -0.266** -0.298** -0.164** -0.287** 
 (-7.14) (-5.47) (-5.56) (-2.77) (-3.81) 
      
ManyBds x  0.264 0.0428 0.231 0.177 0.239 
CEO (1.56) (0.26) (1.36) (1.09) (1.03) 
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Age75 -0.351** -0.341** -0.306** -0.355** -0.199 
 (-3.05) (-3.02) (-2.75) (-2.89) (-1.01) 
      
NomMbr -0.168
** -0.126** -0.108** -0.134** -0.113* 
 (-4.22) (-3.29) (-2.77) (-3.24) (-2.06) 
      
Empl_Dir -1.030
** -0.848** -0.885** -0.957** -0.943** 
 (-11.04) (-10.05) (-9.89) (-10.09) (-7.30) 
      
OutDirLink -1.303
** -0.967** -1.022** -1.156** -1.245** 
 (-18.24) (-14.72) (-14.96) (-15.41) (-10.82) 
      
Tot_Dir_Shs 1.183
** 1.424** 1.246** 1.172* 1.855* 
 (2.60) (2.95) (2.68) (2.50) (2.43) 
      
Interlock -0.110 -0.306
+ 0.334+ -0.127 0.121 
 (-0.61) (-1.77) (1.92) (-0.78) (0.42) 
      
Chairman_ 0.0349 -0.0803 -0.102 -0.00752 -0.0894 
 Only (0.31) (-0.80) (-0.91) (-0.06) (-0.50) 
      
IP No -1.507
** -0.631** -1.360** -1.381** -1.893** 
 (-5.10) (-4.54) (-5.14) (-4.83) (-9.00) 
      
ClassBd -0.263
** -0.208** -0.252** -0.277** -0.146 
 (-3.44) (-2.89) (-3.37) (-3.53) (-1.32) 
      
PPill -0.0929 -0.0770 -0.0950 -0.121 -0.179 
 (-1.10) (-0.97) (-1.14) (-1.37) (-1.42) 
      
CumVote -0.0859 -0.0157 -0.100 -0.0711 0.113 
 (-0.64) (-0.12) (-0.76) (-0.50) (0.69) 
      
GP -0.0592 -0.126 -0.0638 -0.0536 -0.0110 
 (-0.61) (-1.37) (-0.67) (-0.53) (-0.07) 
      
Top5AbRet 0.445
* 0.414* 0.394* 0.385* 0.475* 
 (2.57) (2.44) (2.31) (2.25) (2.18) 
      
Bot5AbRet -0.484
** -0.438** -0.391** -0.563** -0.677** 
 (-3.47) (-3.22) (-2.94) (-3.15) (-3.82) 
      
CHOIFISCHKAHAN GALLEYSF 7/8/2010  2:55 PM 
2010] THE POWER OF PROXY ADVISORS 913 
 
Top5AbRet x  -0.134 -0.109 -0.0603 -0.0317 -0.232 
 CEO (-0.66) (-0.55) (-0.30) (-0.16) (-1.26) 
      
Bot5AbRet x  0.310
+ 0.318* 0.177 0.212 0.119 
 CEO (1.92) (2.05) (1.09) (1.59) (0.49) 
      
Sdret -31.62
** -26.91** -28.99** -29.53** -17.93+ 
 (-4.48) (-3.91) (-4.14) (-3.82) (-1.81) 
      
ln(Market  -0.126
** -0.125** -0.132** -0.131** -0.119* 
Capitalization) (-3.93) (-4.17) (-4.16) (-3.69) (-2.55) 
      
InstHold 0.465 0.460 0.474 0.363 0.486 
 (1.42) (1.48) (1.46) (1.04) (1.05) 
      
Year06 0.0197 0.00358 0.0420 0.00388 0.0910 
 (0.30) (0.06) (0.65) (0.06) (1.05) 
      
VoteISS  -2.216
**    
  (-25.54)    
      
VoteGL   -1.182
**   
   (-21.52)   
      
VoteEJ    -0.595
**  
    (-9.22)  
      
VotePG     -0.559
** 
     (-3.22) 
      
Constant 6.003
** 5.946** 6.084** 6.078** 5.309** 
 (11.80) (12.34) (11.96) (10.84) (7.60) 
N 12644 12605 12563 11447 4624 
adj. R2 0.109 0.185 0.163 0.119 0.143 
t statistics in parentheses: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 4: Marginal Impact of a Withhold Recommendation at Varying 
Points on “For” Vote Distribution (Calculated Using a “For” 
Recommendation) 
 
“For” Vote 
Distribution 
ISS 
Withhold 
GL 
Withhold 
EJ 
Withhold 
PGI  
Withhold 
5% 0.2547 0.0859 0.0403 0.0437 
10% 0.2171 0.0692 0.0312 0.0340 
25% 0.1699 0.0505 0.0216 0.0221 
50% 0.1310 0.0368 0.0154 0.0157 
75% 0.1015 0.0273 0.0113 0.0117 
90% 0.0780 0.0209 0.0085 0.0087 
95% 0.0660 0.0180 0.0071 0.0074 
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Table 5 
 
Panel A: “For” Vote Outcome 
Variable Model 
CEO -0.709** 
 (-10.07) 
  
New Director 0.173** 
 (3.51) 
  
AuditMbr -0.210** 
 (-4.72) 
  
Prior Restat -0.104 
 (-0.80) 
  
Prior SEC -0.229** 
 (-2.62) 
  
Prior Restat x AuditMbr -0.0837 
 (-0.83) 
  
Prior SEC x AuditMbr -0.0901 
 (-1.20) 
  
CompMbr -0.290** 
 (-6.62) 
  
Top5AbComp -0.0718 
 (-0.52) 
  
Top5AbComp x CompMbr -0.251* 
 (-2.04) 
  
Attendance -0.850** 
 (-6.98) 
  
ManyBds -0.190** 
 (-4.00) 
  
ManyBds x CEO 0.0192 
 (0.12) 
  
Age75 -0.296** 
 (-2.71) 
  
NomMbr -0.0838* 
 (-2.24) 
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Empl_Dir -0.724** 
 (-9.01) 
  
OutDirLink -0.763** 
 (-11.93) 
  
Tot_Dir_Shs 1.499** 
 (3.03) 
  
Interlock 0.116 
 (0.68) 
  
Chairman_Only -0.188+ 
 (-1.90) 
  
IP No -0.557** 
 (-4.11) 
  
ClassBd -0.200** 
 (-2.83) 
  
PPill -0.0809 
 (-1.03) 
  
CumVote -0.0394 
 (-0.31) 
  
GP -0.126 
 (-1.40) 
  
Top5AbRet 0.369* 
 (2.21) 
  
Bot5AbRet -0.350** 
 (-2.74) 
  
Top5AbRet x CEO -0.0444 
 (-0.22) 
  
Bot5AbRet x CEO 0.211 
 (1.35) 
  
Sdret -24.60** 
 (-3.61) 
  
ln(Market Capitalization) -0.131** 
 (-4.39) 
  
InstHold 0.470 
 (1.51) 
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Year06 0.0344 
 (0.54) 
  
VoteISS -2.473** 
 (-26.62) 
  
VoteGL -1.123** 
 (-21.94) 
  
VoteISS x VoteGL 0.995** 
 (6.74) 
  
Constant 6.024** 
 (12.51) 
N 12524 
adj. R2 0.230 
t statistics in parentheses: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.  
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Panel B: Expected and Marginal “For” Votes 
 ISS “For” 
Rec. 
ISS Withhold Rec. Marginal Impact 
of ISS Withhold 
Rec. 
Glass Lewis  
“For” Rec. 
98.4% 83.9% -14.5% 
Glass Lewis 
Withhold Rec. 
95.3% 82.1% -13.2% 
Marginal Impact 
of Glass Lewis 
Withhold Rec. 
-3.1% -1.8%  
All expected and marginal “For” votes are calculated at the median of the log odds 
for vote distribution. 
 
 
Table 6: Institutional v. Non-Institutional Investor Model 
Variable Model 
Tot_Dir_Shs 1.290** 
 (2.77) 
  
InstHold 0.583+ 
 (1.81) 
  
InstHold x VoteISS -3.137** 
 (-15.29) 
  
IndivHold x VoteISS -1.248** 
 (-4.52) 
  
Constant 5.895** 
 (12.21) 
N 12605 
adj. R2 0.187 
t statistics in parentheses: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.  Unreported, the 
models all include the same independent variables as in the base log-odds for vote 
model (reported above as Model 1 of Table 3). 
 
